The reason for this is delivery problems with aluminium caused by a fire at the factory of key supplier Novelis.

It is currently unclear whether production of the Lightning will resume at all.

The combustion engine division ‘Ford Blue’ showed decent growth, while the EV division ‘Model e’ posted a loss of $1.4 billion, or approximately €1.2 billion, for the third quarter, which was $200 million more than in the same period last year. From January to September, the electric division’s loss amounted to $3.6 billion.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.zip/post/51624620

Opel may rebadge the Leapmotor B10 for Europe by 2026

Production could begin at Stellantis’ Zaragoza plant in Spain

Opel may rebadge the Leapmotor B10 for Europe by 2026

Production could begin at Stellantis’ Zaragoza plant in Spain

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.zip/post/51624463

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https://itif.org/publications/2025/06/30/congress-should-fully-fund-nsf-tip-directorate/

Hi fellow selfhosters,

Just wanted to know if any of you got the same issue: everytime there’s a new version of Nextcloud available (package version at https://download.nextcloud.com/server/releases/), it’s EXTREMELY slow to download (70KiB/s or less) to the point that my automation just fails miserably to update my current install.

Am I alone here? Is there some kind of official mirrors I’m not aware of that can speed things up?

A Russian fighter and a refueler crossed the EU’s external border Thursday night as the bloc’s leaders discussed their defense plans.

A Russian fighter jet and a refueling aircraft briefly crossed into Lithuanian airspace from the Kaliningrad region on Thursday evening, the Lithuanian Armed Forces said.

Lithuania’s President Gitanas Nausėda condemned what he described as "a cruel violation of international law and territorial sovereignty of Lithuania.”

“We have to react to this,” he wrote on X, posting from Brussels.

The intrusion came as EU leaders in Brussels were discussing ways to strengthen the bloc’s security at Thursday's European Council. For Lithuania, which has seen a growing number of airspace violations in recent months — from fighter jets and drones to balloons — air defense remains a top priority.

Japan's new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi pledges to boost military spending and deepen US ties amid rising regional tensions.

Japan's new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said she will bolster the country's military spending as tensions rise with China, North Korea and Russia.

In her first major policy speech since taking office Tuesday, Japan's first female leader said the government will increase military spending to 2% of Tokyo's gross domestic product by March—a goal previously set for 2027.

"The free, open and stable international order that we were accustomed to is violently shaken in the face of historic change of power balance and intensifying geopolitical competitions," Takaichi said.

"In the region around Japan, military activities and other actions from our neighbors China, North Korea and Russia are causing grave concerns."

I did not build this, simply sharing it.

Frankly quite surprised to see this has not been mentioned on Lemmy yet. Have been working on migrating away from Spotify to Navidrome for a while now, but wasn't completely satisfied with the UI of Navidrome. Luckily I stumbled upon this project and having used it for a week or so now i thought it would be a good idea to share it and give the project some love! <3

I plan on doing a detailed write up of how i went along with migrating to Navidrome as soon as I have all my playlists and discoverability in order, stay tuned :)

GitHub Link: https://github.com/victoralvesf/aonsoku, License: MIT

Features

• Subsonic Integration: Aonsoku integrates with your Navidrome or Subsonic server, providing you with easy access to your music collection.
• Intuitive UI: Modern, clean and user-friendly interface designed to enhance your music listening experience.
• Podcast Support: With Aonsoku Podcasts you can easily access, manage, and listen to your favorites podcasts directly within the app. Enjoy advanced search options, customizable filters and seamless listening synchronization to enhance your podcast experience.
• Synchronized lyrics: Aonsoku will automatically find a synced lyric from LRCLIB if none is provided by the server.
• Unsynchronized lyrics: If your songs have embedded unsynchronized lyrics, Aonsoku is able to show them.
• Radio: If your server supports it, listen to radio shows directly within Aonsoku.
• Scrobble: Sync played songs with your server.

Screenshots

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/44587032

Archived

[...]

China makes more than the world can take.

This tension, of course, is not new. China’s “overcapacity”—the shorthand term for producing more than demand calls for—has long led other governments to complain. In the past, China produced too much steel, coal, cement, and other goods, which crowded out competitors elsewhere and drove global prices to unprofitable lows.

China’s tendency toward overcapacity has traditionally been blamed on a fundamental mismatch in its economy; government subsidies and investment in manufacturing and infrastructure are unusually high compared with those in other advanced economies, and the country’s household consumption as a share of GDP is unusually low. Simply put, China lacks enough domestic demand to soak up what the country’s factories produce, which then causes a glut of exports.

[...]

The real challenge, then, lies [...] in an extraordinary and seemingly uncontrollable surge in supply—one that Beijing is struggling to get its arms around. Since mid‑2024, central government authorities have warned repeatedly about “blind expansion” in solar power, batteries, and EVs. This summer, after a brutal price war in the solar industry saw prices fall around 40 percent year-over-year, Chinese leaders directed officials to tackle overcapacity and “irrational” pricing in key industries, including solar. Shortly thereafter, high-level officials met with industry leaders to collectively urge companies to curb price wars and strengthen industry regulations.

[...]

Unlike earlier bouts of [Chinese] overcapacity, today’s top offenders are private companies, not state-owned enterprises. If Beijing were to step in and force consolidations or shutter factories, it would risk sparking unemployment and potentially stall local growth engines that depend on these industries. Moreover, exports have become one of the few remaining bright spots in otherwise slowing GDP performance. If Beijing were to meaningfully curb production and exports, it could cause significant damage to China’s overall economy.

[...]

By rewarding speed and scale over productivity and differentiation, the internal plumbing of China’s political economy incentivizes businesses to produce too much stuff. Although that has always been the predictable outcome of China’s political and financial system, the dysfunction was kept in check during much of China’s spectacular rise. Changes in the Chinese economy since 2020, however, including the cratering real estate market and a crackdown on private businesses and investments, have compounded the structural incentives that lead to overcapacity.

[...]

China’s tendency to overproduce starts in an unlikely place: the Chinese Communist Party’s performance and promotion system. In the CCP bureaucracy, local officials are evaluated primarily on their ability to deliver growth, employment, and tax revenues. But China’s largest single tax, the value-added tax (VAT), is split evenly between the central government and the local government of the place where a good or service is produced, not the place where it is consumed. Since the system allocates tax revenue to regions based on production, it rewards the decision to build larger industrial bases. Local Chinese officials try to retain as much upstream and downstream activity as they can to expand their tax base.

[...]

This system effectively encourages provincial and municipal leaders [China] to act like industrial investors or venture capitalists. And in many cases, it has produced profound efficiencies. Over the past decade, for instance, Hefei, the capital of Anhui Province, has poured about $25 billion of state capital into various struggling companies, including the EV maker Nio and the flat-panel display manufacturer BOE, to great effect. By acting as an early investor and bearing the initial risk, Hefei stimulated about $96 billion in follow-on investment and generated around $9 billion in tax revenues. The Hefei model has since been widely imitated, with other provinces racing to assemble their own industrial clusters.

[...]

Firms rarely close down operations altogether [if they become unprofitable], however, because the state-backed banks prefer to roll over existing loans so that the firms appear solvent on paper. That way, even if those companies are only servicing their interest payments and not generating strong returns, the banks avoid having to book immediate losses—and avoid potentially contributing to the collapse of a large local employer. Credit keeps flowing into these “zombie” sectors and companies with declining productivity even as they are dragging down the broader economy in the long run.

Private firms not chasing government-backed industries, meanwhile, have long struggled to access affordable bank credit, which means they tend to seek capital from costly nonbank channels, such as venture capital, private equity, and initial public offerings. These channels helped fuel much of China’s record growth in the first two decades of the twenty-first century: by October 2020, 217 Chinese companies were listed on major U.S. exchanges with a combined $2.2 trillion market cap, illustrating how deeply private firms tapped global equity markets. Leading venture capital platforms scaled as well. Sequoia’s China arm (now HongShan), for instance, backed hundreds of private firms, including some of China’s most prominent success stories, such as the social media company ByteDance and the transportation platform Didi.

[...]

The price wars are a mere symptom of the overcapacity problem. Beijing can’t hope to make meaningful progress without reengineering the underlying incentive structure that is causing overcapacity. Consider, for example, how the CCP evaluates local officials. At present, cadres are promoted largely based on how much growth they deliver; that means judging them based on how much new factory space they build and how many roads or industrial parks they pave. Such measures favor scale over quality.

[...]

To create a more sustainable model—one that encourages innovation but doesn’t spiral into overcapacity—China will have to undergo an institutional reckoning. The logic of speed over quality, of scale over innovation, and of investment volume over returns is deeply embedded in the system. Reversing that logic means making long-deferred tradeoffs and moving past the structures that once powered China’s incredible rise.

[...]

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