cross-posted from: https://lemmy.world/post/32023094

If I could relax as effectively as a cat, I wouldn't have to take anxiety pills.

...

The problem is that each attack is treated as a separate incident against a separate country. The evidence is investigated nationally, the condemnation is issued nationally and any response is left to the country attacked. The campaign against Europe is broken into isolated cases, making a collective response politically much harder.

And it is a collective response that is the best way to respond to these attacks and force Russia into some kind of restraint. Europe should treat every confidently attributed Russian operation as part of an attack on European security, then select a collective and proportionate response from an agreed ladder of measures.

...

The term “hybrid” once described a useful fact. Russia mixes sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation, political interference and deniable kinetic attacks. Sure, the mix is hybrid but the political effect of the label has changed.

It makes acts of violence sound ambiguous, manageable and somehow less real. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys put it plainly: “Russia’s attacks against us are no longer hybrid. They are very kinetic.”

Radosław Sikorski, the Polish foreign minister, spoke in a similar vein, saying on Thursday that “Russia’s hybrid war against Europe has already taken on a ‘kinetic’ dimension” and that these are “on the border between hybrid warfare and outright aggression."

...

Donald Tusk has warned that Russia could strike NATO territory and then present the incident as “accidental”. The official story, he said, would be that there was no reason to consider a NATO response.

That's the point. Russia wants Article 5 to appear, in Tusk’s words, “more theoretical than practical”. The immediate target may be a train, factory, airport or undersea cable but the strategic target is the credibility of collective defense. The Kremlin also wants to break European unity and wear down support for Ukraine.

NATO already accepts that a hybrid operation could, in some circumstances, trigger Article 5. The obstacle is political. Allies examine each incident separately, so almost every operation appears too small to justify a collective response.

...

Europe must reverse that calculation. An attack intended to divide European countries should bring them closer together. An operation designed to weaken Ukraine support should automatically produce more weapons, funding or air defense for Ukraine. Every Russian attempt to frighten one country should trigger a visible response from all.

...

Archived

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/11402708

...

The problem is that each attack is treated as a separate incident against a separate country. The evidence is investigated nationally, the condemnation is issued nationally and any response is left to the country attacked. The campaign against Europe is broken into isolated cases, making a collective response politically much harder.

And it is a collective response that is the best way to respond to these attacks and force Russia into some kind of restraint. Europe should treat every confidently attributed Russian operation as part of an attack on European security, then select a collective and proportionate response from an agreed ladder of measures.

...

The term “hybrid” once described a useful fact. Russia mixes sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation, political interference and deniable kinetic attacks. Sure, the mix is hybrid but the political effect of the label has changed.

It makes acts of violence sound ambiguous, manageable and somehow less real. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys put it plainly: “Russia’s attacks against us are no longer hybrid. They are very kinetic.”

Radosław Sikorski, the Polish foreign minister, spoke in a similar vein, saying on Thursday that “Russia’s hybrid war against Europe has already taken on a ‘kinetic’ dimension” and that these are “on the border between hybrid warfare and outright aggression."

...

Donald Tusk has warned that Russia could strike NATO territory and then present the incident as “accidental”. The official story, he said, would be that there was no reason to consider a NATO response.

That's the point. Russia wants Article 5 to appear, in Tusk’s words, “more theoretical than practical”. The immediate target may be a train, factory, airport or undersea cable but the strategic target is the credibility of collective defense. The Kremlin also wants to break European unity and wear down support for Ukraine.

NATO already accepts that a hybrid operation could, in some circumstances, trigger Article 5. The obstacle is political. Allies examine each incident separately, so almost every operation appears too small to justify a collective response.

...

Europe must reverse that calculation. An attack intended to divide European countries should bring them closer together. An operation designed to weaken Ukraine support should automatically produce more weapons, funding or air defense for Ukraine. Every Russian attempt to frighten one country should trigger a visible response from all.

...

Archived

The best things don’t arrive at the door because you clicked “buy now.”

They arrive because, while you were searching somewhere else,

they had already, on quiet paws,

found you.

Maybe this is an old change, and everybody else knew about it, but I discovered just now that if you click the Steam Deck compatibility "Learn more" button then it also have tabs for SteamOS, Steam Machine and Steam Frame.

Comments

Comments

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/11402699

...

Populists [in Europe] adept at finding a foreign (or migrant) culprit behind almost every grievance have somehow developed a blind spot the size of China. Whether on the left or the right, Europe’s firebrands are oddly unwilling to cast Beijing as the villain of the piece. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) thinks China is so fantastic it wants Germany to take part in its „Belt and Road” infrastructure initiative. In Hungary the Fidesz party of Viktor Orban, which got its start bashing commies of the Soviet ilk, became cheerleaders for their Chinese comrades. On the left, Unsubmissive France [the leftwing populist party “La France Insoumise”] has warned against European „meddling”, should China one day invade Taiwan.

...

Both unions and employers in Europe are fretting about a new China Shock. Most voters across the continent have an unfavourable view of the country. This ought to be pure demagogic gold. Granted, for a populist in search of synthetic outrage, a factory worker in Shenzhen „stealing our jobs” is less tangible than a local migrant supposedly filching our social security.

...

What lies behind this China populism gap? In Germany it may be a matter of personnel. The AfD’s leader, Alice Weidel, is a longtime Sinophile, said to speak decent Mandarin after years working there and writing her PhD thesis on the country’s pension system. (Why she is so indulgent towards Russia is another question.) And in countries where populists rule, vast investments from Chinese firms have paid rich dividends to their members. Within weeks of being booted out of office, Mr Orban’s long-standing foreign minister resurfaced as a lobbyist for BYD, a Chinese carmaker.

Moreover, for many populists, China is less a bête noire than a model. Authoritarianism à la Beijing has a certain allure to wannabe strongmen in Europe. The overt form of nationalism practised there contrasts with the mushy globalism that typifies the European Union. In the demagogic imagination, Europe is hobbling itself by following international norms—whether on green issues, trade or human rights—that China barely pays lip service to. This worldview pictures Europeans as the patsies of an international order that China, and perhaps America these days, have worked out how to exploit. If you can’t beat China, the pedlars of outrage might think, at least try to imitate it.

...

But the main problem for Europe’s wannabe China-antagonists is that picking a fight with Beijing would require the very thing populists profess to hate most: more Europe. For only by acting collectively through Brussels do Europeans have any hope of swaying policy in Beijing. The EU has already imposed tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, though imports keep rising. On September 16th Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, described the deficit with China as having reached „a tipping point” and hinted at further trade measures, should it persist.

Trade-wary populists ought to be cheering. For now they are silent, careful not to suggest the EU is doing anything right. Soon they may have little choice but to show their hand, posits Janka Oertel of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank. Once China was a foreign-policy issue, one that voters were not paying much attention to. If a trade war pitting China against Europe ensues, as seems ever more probable, it will become much harder for demagogues to sit on the fence, let alone cheer for the opposition. Soon Europe’s populists will have to decide whether China is a model to borrow from, or a threat to rail against.

...

Archived

The original article is behind a paywall.

It sometimes sleeps like this. I guess it's more comfortable?

Examples of comments:

"It feels like a cheat code to me. It feels like I'm not going to be as smart as the people who are currently in the field that I want to be in — because of AI."

"We're going to be dealing with the leftovers and downsides to what the politicians and others are doing [about AI regulation], and we don't get a say in it," he said.

Cross posted from: https://lemmy.nocturnal.garden/post/913747

Comments

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/11402699

...

Populists [in Europe] adept at finding a foreign (or migrant) culprit behind almost every grievance have somehow developed a blind spot the size of China. Whether on the left or the right, Europe’s firebrands are oddly unwilling to cast Beijing as the villain of the piece. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) thinks China is so fantastic it wants Germany to take part in its „Belt and Road” infrastructure initiative. In Hungary the Fidesz party of Viktor Orban, which got its start bashing commies of the Soviet ilk, became cheerleaders for their Chinese comrades. On the left, Unsubmissive France [the leftwing populist party “La France Insoumise”] has warned against European „meddling”, should China one day invade Taiwan.

...

Both unions and employers in Europe are fretting about a new China Shock. Most voters across the continent have an unfavourable view of the country. This ought to be pure demagogic gold. Granted, for a populist in search of synthetic outrage, a factory worker in Shenzhen „stealing our jobs” is less tangible than a local migrant supposedly filching our social security.

...

What lies behind this China populism gap? In Germany it may be a matter of personnel. The AfD’s leader, Alice Weidel, is a longtime Sinophile, said to speak decent Mandarin after years working there and writing her PhD thesis on the country’s pension system. (Why she is so indulgent towards Russia is another question.) And in countries where populists rule, vast investments from Chinese firms have paid rich dividends to their members. Within weeks of being booted out of office, Mr Orban’s long-standing foreign minister resurfaced as a lobbyist for BYD, a Chinese carmaker.

Moreover, for many populists, China is less a bête noire than a model. Authoritarianism à la Beijing has a certain allure to wannabe strongmen in Europe. The overt form of nationalism practised there contrasts with the mushy globalism that typifies the European Union. In the demagogic imagination, Europe is hobbling itself by following international norms—whether on green issues, trade or human rights—that China barely pays lip service to. This worldview pictures Europeans as the patsies of an international order that China, and perhaps America these days, have worked out how to exploit. If you can’t beat China, the pedlars of outrage might think, at least try to imitate it.

...

But the main problem for Europe’s wannabe China-antagonists is that picking a fight with Beijing would require the very thing populists profess to hate most: more Europe. For only by acting collectively through Brussels do Europeans have any hope of swaying policy in Beijing. The EU has already imposed tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, though imports keep rising. On September 16th Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, described the deficit with China as having reached „a tipping point” and hinted at further trade measures, should it persist.

Trade-wary populists ought to be cheering. For now they are silent, careful not to suggest the EU is doing anything right. Soon they may have little choice but to show their hand, posits Janka Oertel of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank. Once China was a foreign-policy issue, one that voters were not paying much attention to. If a trade war pitting China against Europe ensues, as seems ever more probable, it will become much harder for demagogues to sit on the fence, let alone cheer for the opposition. Soon Europe’s populists will have to decide whether China is a model to borrow from, or a threat to rail against.

...

Archived

The original article is behind a paywall.