The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), attached to the United States Department of the Treasury, issued General License 56 (GL 56) and Venezuela General License 57 (GL 57).
It is important to clarify, first of all, that this does not constitute a lifting of sanctions. Both instruments are part of a package of measures designed to facilitate certain economic activities in light of new foreign investment in the country.
KEY COMPONENTS OF GL 57
General License 57 (GL 57), issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), authorizes —generally and without prior individual applications— a wide range of financial transactions that were previously prohibited under sanctions against Venezuela, particularly those established by Executive Order 13884 and the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations.
Specifically, GL 57 allows transactions that are "ordinarily incidental and necessary" for the provision, export or re-export (direct or indirect) of financial services in favor of the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV).
Several state-owned banks also benefit from this measure:
- Bank of Venezuela, SA Universal Bank
- Digital Bank of Workers, Universal Bank CA
- Treasury Bank, CA Universal Bank
These entities, which operate on both the first and second levels of the Venezuelan financial system, concentrate the largest mass of account holders in the country, far surpassing private banks in reach and penetration.
Furthermore, the license extends to any entity in which one or more of the aforementioned banks hold a direct or indirect stake equal to or greater than 50%.
GL 57 also includes natural persons linked to the "Government of Venezuela" who are blocked only by that generic definition — that is, those not individually designated on OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list — including active public employees.
Authorized financial services include, among others:
- Account maintenance, operation, or closure
- Granting of loans and credits
- Fund transfers (including in US dollars)
- Payment processing (payroll, pensions, subsidies, etc.)
- Other usual banking and financial services
Transactions with the Government of Venezuela that are necessary to carry out the activities described are also authorized.
This measure opens the possibility for the BCV to use accounts in the international financial system to receive direct payments to the nation, for example, derived from oil exports.
It also facilitates Venezuela's reintegration into the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) system, the global interbank network dominated by the United States. It is important to clarify that Venezuela was never completely disconnected from the international financial system: the country had developed alternative mechanisms through agreements with China and Russia. However, the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV) had been barred from SWIFT, and GL 57 now authorizes its return to this key platform.
However, GL 57 does not unlock any previously frozen assets, nor does it release the BCV's international reserves abroad, nor does it affect strategic assets such as CITGO Petroleum in US territory.
It also does not authorize transactions prohibited by other provisions of the sanctions regulations against Venezuela, unless they have separate authorizations. Furthermore, any transaction involving individuals or entities listed in the SDN is excluded.
These restrictions demonstrate the persistence of an illegal coercive sanctions framework, far from constituting a genuine lifting of sanctions. Therefore, GL 57 should be understood as a limited and conditional relaxation.
However, it offers favorable conditions for the development of economic activity in Venezuela in the short and medium term.
For the first time in years, the country could do without using intermediary accounts abroad to receive income from its oil exports, thus avoiding bureaucratic hurdles and intrusive monitoring imposed by the U.S. Treasury.
This would allow for a more timely flow of foreign currency into the national exchange system, which would contribute to:
- Reduce the exchange rate gap
- Improve the availability of foreign currency in the formal market
- Mitigating inflation and monetary volatility
Effects that, in turn, would have a positive impact on the daily economy of millions of Venezuelans.
Furthermore, GL 57 improves the business climate and strengthens the confidence of external investors by reducing operational uncertainties in the financial sector.
Finally, this opens the door for Venezuela to fully exercise its rights before multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Since 2019, the country has had approximately $4.9 billion in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) blocked. Although these are Venezuelan state reserve assets, their use has been restricted due to the sanctions framework imposed by the United States and its allies within the IMF.
KEY COMPONENTS OF THE GL 56
General License 56 (GL 56) authorizes the negotiation and signing of contingent contracts — also called “preliminary contracts” — for future commercial transactions with the Government of Venezuela.
These agreements can be signed without violating existing sanctions, but their effective implementation requires subsequent specific authorization from OFAC. This provision facilitates the preparation phase for investments, projects, or commercial transactions without incurring violations during the initial stages of dialogue.
However, far from expanding flexibility in trade relations with Venezuela, GL 59 reinforces pre-existing restrictions, turning OFAC—as an extension of the US government—into a mechanism for direct control over the sovereign decisions of the Venezuelan state.
Furthermore, GL 56 reaffirms prohibitions already established in previous Trump administration licenses: it explicitly forbids negotiating and entering into contracts with entities from countries such as China, Russia, and Iran. While these restrictions are an integral part of the illegal sanctions regime imposed on Venezuela, the novelty lies in the fact that OFAC now expressly names these countries as exclusion targets, openly displaying its geopolitical agenda.
It is clear that GL 56 does not represent a lifting of sanctions, but rather a selective foreign policy tool that continues to instrumentalize economic coercion as a means of pressure.
However, it possesses a relevant attribute: it allows for the early consolidation of certain negotiations—always under the supervision and approval of OFAC—that could have significant and positive impacts for Venezuela. A key example is the recovery of the National Electric System, which has been severely deteriorated for years.
Western companies like General Electric and Siemens hold patents and critical technologies used in Venezuela's electrical infrastructure. Both companies suspended all operations in the country following the 2019 sanctions, which penalized any dealings with the Venezuelan government. Now, GL 56 opens the possibility for them to resume activities, including the supply of compatible spare parts and essential technical services.
Furthermore, the authorization of preliminary contracts broadens the range of opportunities in strategic sectors. Both the Venezuelan state and national companies could more effectively negotiate agreements with foreign partners for the provision of strategic goods, specialized services, or critical infrastructure, provided they have prior approval from OFAC.
In summary, GL 56 does not release sovereignty, but it does create conditional windows that, if used with technical and diplomatic prudence, could generate tangible benefits in areas vital to the country's economic and social stability.
THE SANCTIONS RATE PERSISTS
Objectively, if the implementation of the licenses proceeds without major obstacles, it could contribute to the improvement of certain economic conditions in Venezuela: greater investment, access to essential equipment and services, productive reactivation, a more stable flow of foreign currency, a reduction in the exchange rate gap and, consequently, a moderation of inflation.
However, the illegal sanctions framework persists, and with it, control mechanisms are entrenched, slowing down business growth and limiting the expansion of economic activities. Therefore, we are faced with a limited, conditional, and reversible easing of restrictions.
General Licenses 56 and 57 are likely a direct result of the trade schemes being rebuilt in Venezuela, driven by the return of US and Western companies—especially in the oil sector—to the negotiating table after years of absence.
Currently, the U.S. government maintains a form of financial pressure by conditioning Venezuela's access to the resources generated by its own crude oil exports. The revenues from these sales flow into an account called "Venezuela" at the Treasury Department, managed under strict, opaque, and highly discretionary bureaucratic mechanisms.
According to various media reports , US companies themselves have faced difficulties in meeting their payment obligations related to essential services, due to the convoluted flow of capital to Venezuela.
Furthermore, sources cited in the press have indicated that the slowness and arbitrariness of the US government in processing disbursements destined for Venezuela has become a new obstacle for the national exchange system, exacerbating uncertainty, volatility and distortions derived from the exchange rate differential.
In this context, acting president Delcy Rodríguez has repeatedly insisted on the need to definitively dismantle all sanctions imposed against the Venezuelan economy. She has emphasized that the temporary and revocable nature of these licenses creates legal uncertainty and hinders the implementation of long-term investment agreements, precisely when the country requires stable and predictable commitments for its economic recovery.
The US government has removed from its public discourse almost all the claims that in recent years “justified” the illegal sanctions, which referred to Venezuela as a “narco-terrorist” “dictatorial” state.
Now, that same sanctions map – despite the licenses – continues to distort the business climate in Venezuela and goes against the interests of US and Western companies that now do business with the Bolivarian Government.
