this post was submitted on 14 Jan 2026
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What? Only when they are configured to listen on outside interfaces. Which, granted, they often are in default configuration, but when OP uses Docker on that host, chances are kinda slim that they run some rando unconfigured database directly. Which still would be password or authentication protected in default config.
I mean, it is never wrong slapping a firewall onto something, I guess. But OTOH those "all services will be exposed and evil haxxors will take you over" is also a disservice.
I've seen many default docker-compose configurations provided by server software that expose the ports of stuff like databases by default (which exposes it on all host interfaces). Even outside docker, a lot of software, has a default configuration of "listen on all interfaces".
I'm also not saying "evil haxxors will take you over". It's not the end of the world to have a service requiring authentication exposed to the internet, but it's much better to only expose what should be public.
Yep, fair. Those docker-composes which just forward the ports to the host on all interfaces should burn. At least they should make them 127.0.0.1 forwards, I agree.
I'm guilty of a few of these and sorry not sorry but this is not changing.
Often these are written with local dev and testing in mind, and in any case the expectation is that self-hosters will look through them and probably customize them - and in any case be responsble for their own firewalls and proxies - before deploying them to a public-facing server. Larger deployments sometimes have internal load balancers on separate machines so even when reflecting a production deployment, exposing on 0.0.0.0 or running eith network=host might be normal.
Never just run third-party compose files for user services on a machine directly exposed to untrusted networks like the internet.