Here's the thing: this is exactly what the communist parties outside Russia also struggled with. Stalin made a deal with Hitler. Molotov literally said "Fascism? Fascism is purely a matter of taste".

For the first two weeks of the war, the communist parties felt conflicted but ultimately didn't need to change their stance. They were anti-fascist after all, and the UK and France had now declared war on the Nazis so this received the CPs support. Maurice Thorez even joined the French army (for a couple weeks until he left to go to Moscow).

But then, Stalin invaded Poland, and they met the Nazis as allies in the middle. Stalin publicly came out in support of Hitler's "peace programme". This caused some serious conflicts in the CPs in the west. Suddenly the logic shifted:

the UK and France had colonial empires, Germany did not
the UK and France declared war on Germany, not the other way around
the Germans had signed a pact of friendship with the USSR

So surely, it was better to focus on being anti-imperialist, focused against the UK and France instead of focusing on Germany.

You'll find many socialist and communist newspapers started putting out pro-German propaganda (and some were banned for it). This only changed after 41, when the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union.

The Soviets were never "totally fine" with the Nazis. But for a time they were happy to see the Nazis turned towards the west, and they saw the opportunity to get some benefits for themselves too.

[–] Cowbee@lemmy.ml 3 points 4 months ago (2 children)

It seems you keep shifting and shifting and shifting. The soviets remained the most consistent, largest, and most millitant anti-Nazi group, while the west made it clear that they had quite a large pro-Nazi population. And I addressed them in the comments I linked, not going to rewrite it out for you.

[–] AnarchoBolshevik@lemmygrad.ml 3 points 4 months ago (2 children)

Despite the [German–Soviet] pact, Communist resistance started very quickly in the Pas‐de‐Calais. The particular circumstances of the Forbidden Zone allowed for an independence of action that Auguste Lecœur and Julien Hapiot were able to take maximum advantage of. They decided, in August 1940, to begin organising illegal Communist activity against the occupying forces.⁷

[…]

Thus, the Communists of the Pas‐de‐Calais began their anti‐[Reich] propaganda very early on. Nevertheless, the Communists of the region did not think of themselves as disloyal to their party and their confidence in the Soviet Union was as strong as ever, it was simply that the daily reality of the Forbidden Zone pushed then more rapidly to a more anti‐[Reich] position than their comrades elsewhere.

(Emphasis added. Source.)

[–] Cowbee@lemmy.ml 2 points 4 months ago

Fantastic, thank you very much as always, comrade.

[–] ChairmanMeow@programming.dev -2 points 4 months ago (1 children)

the daily reality of the Forbidden Zone pushed then more rapidly to a more anti‐[Reich] position than their comrades elsewhere.

Yeah this was my point. It took a bit for various communist groups to pivot back to being primarily anti-reich. Those who suffered directly under the Nazis turned faster, e.g. those in northern France took the anti-reich position before the British communists did (they remained more anti-imperialist aimed at the UK, until the Soviets were invaded).

[–] AnarchoBolshevik@lemmygrad.ml 3 points 4 months ago (1 children)

Far from possessing a single will, the reaction of Communists to the [German]–Soviet Pact and Chamberlain’s declaration of war was confused and heterogeneous, for the war shattered the Party’s whole conception of international politics.

(Source.)

Campaigns to demand shelter facilities, directed by the Communist Party, were also mounted. The government feared that Communist agitation about poor shelter provision in the working-class areas of London might provide fertile ground for political subversion. One incident of this campaign for improved shelter facilities was a demonstration at the Savoy in London's West End. This became the subject of Cabinet investigations. The minutes of the Cabinet meeting record the recommendation that:

…strong action should, if necessary, be taken to prevent demonstrations by bodies of people purporting to seek better shelter accommodation…'

(Source.)

In January 1941, the central committee of the Communist Party of Belgium (Parti Communiste de Belgique, PCB) had started producing Le Drapeau Rouge (Red Flag) clandestinely. While formally supporting the [German–Soviet] pact and placing the blame for the war equally on Berlin and London, in its second edition proclaimed itself to be "against national-socialism, the agent of big business. The struggle for socialism continues."

The resolution of the central committee "accepts the patriotic character of the resistance developed by certain sections of the Anglophile bourgeoisie and recognises the necessity to create a parallel movement to avoid the working class being dragged along behind".¹⁵ Although it is equally fair to say that the anti[fascist] sentiments that were widespread in the Belgian working class pushed the PCB into opposing the occupation more forcefully than the logic of their support for the [German–Soviet] pact would imply.

(Source.)

Albert Ouzoulias, commander of the Bataillons de la Jeunesse (Youth Battalions), armed wing of the Jeunesse Communiste said:

"For us, even a Nazi was a human being. The discussions had centred on this question. The comrades refused to execute a German soldier who could have been a Communist comrade from Hamburg or a worker from Berlin. Even an officer could have been an anti-Nazi teacher. At least, everyone felt that killing a Gestapo officer was justified. But our comrades did not understand that the best way to defend our country during a war was to kill the maximum number of German officers. This would hasten the end of the war and the end of the misfortune that has affected many of the peoples of the world, including the German people. Internationalism at this time was to kill the largest possible number of Nazis".⁵⁵

In fact, the majority of Communists were happy to be rid of the [German–Soviet] pact and were quickly comfortable with the combativity of the new line.

(Source.)

[–] ChairmanMeow@programming.dev -1 points 4 months ago (1 children)

I'm a bit confused as to what you're trying to say here. You seem to be supporting my point that in 39, the communists were primarily anti-imperialist, which by 41 had pivoted back to being primarily anti-reich. They obviously didn't like the reich in that time, that would be ridiculous. But they did in some ways echo some of the pro-German propaganda (eg blaming London for the war).

Your first source also confirms what I'm saying about the confusion caused by the war and the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. The assumption was that the imperialist west would ally with the Nazis and that the Soviets would be fighting the fascists. Yet in a span of 2-3 weeks, the reality was that the Nazis had allied with the Soviets and that the imperialists were fighting the fascists instead. Hence the mentioned confusion and the lack of heterogeneity in the response; various reasons were invented to support the Soviets in this new arrangement (quite interestingly a fair few of those I've seen mentioned here actually, e.g. the "protecting the Poles" line, but at the time it was also argued by some that the USSR had a right to take back those lands from Poland. Though none of them seemed to deny an invasion had taken place altogether like some here are suggesting).

[–] AnarchoBolshevik@lemmygrad.ml 2 points 4 months ago (1 children)

Oh. That is a good point. You really showed me how wrong I was. I wish that I were as smart as you.

[–] ChairmanMeow@programming.dev -1 points 4 months ago

I'm not really sure what the snark is for, I'm asking you a genuine question because you seem to be genuinely engaging and doing actual research.

You listed a number of sources but I didn't quite get what exactly you were replying, so that's why I asked for a clarification. It's a genuine attempt at conversation :(

[–] ChairmanMeow@programming.dev 0 points 4 months ago (1 children)

The comment you linked did not address the direct military collaboration, e.g. the Luftwaffe being coordinated from Minsk. So please, do spell it out. You can't, because you never did address it.

[–] Cowbee@lemmy.ml 3 points 4 months ago (1 children)

It did, because I did. I don't care to play your posturing games.

[–] AnarchoBolshevik@lemmygrad.ml 4 points 4 months ago (2 children)

To be honest, when I first saw the claim about the Minsk radio station I immediately wondered if it was real, but The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, pg. 621 does briefly discuss it and the author cited the ‘German Foreign Office papers, […] p. 480’. Strangely, though, not that many sources discuss it, and the few that I did find had surprisingly little to say about it; finding in depth English information on this radio station is frustratingly uneasy. A couple sources (The Fate of Poles in the USSR and The Polish Review) specifically claim that this station helped the Luftwaffe bomb towns, villages, and cities: a serious accusation that has attracted suspiciously little attention and reeks of Cold War sensationalism. Now I’m starting to wonder: did the Soviets even make good on their presumable promise to help the Luftwaffe?

Here is what pg. 480 of the German Foreign Office papers says:

“The Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe² would be very much obliged to the People’s Commissariat for Telecommunications if—for urgent navigational tests—the Minsk Broadcasting Station could, until further notice and commencing immediately, send out a continuous dash with intermittent call-sign ‘Richard Wilhelm 1.0.’ in the intervals between its programmes, and introduce the name ‘Minsk’ as often as possible in the course of its programme.”

I don’t know if it’s because of my limited expertise in this particular subject or if there is some context that I am overlooking, but judging from this report alone, it really doesn’t sound that scandalous. It sounds downright boring, actually. What do you think: is sending out a continuous dash and repeatedly introducing a name in navigational tests a cause for concern…? Can you feel yourself sweating at all…? Do you think that you’ll lose any sleep tonight…? Even just a little bit…? Be honest.

A funny thing, though:

“One evening a soldier came to the place where I lived and told us he’d heard on the radio that everybody who didn’t want to be under German occupation was welcome in the USSR: the borders were open for everybody.”²¹ As she has heard about the Nazi treatment of Jews in Germany, she says to herself: “Maybe there is a way. Maybe the USSR will save my life.” So together with some friends and her brother, she decides, as she puts it, to take up the “Russian offer.”²² They leave Warsaw on foot on 28 September. She writes: “The next day we were refugees in the care of the Russian Army in Bialystok. […] We were well treated and got some food and shelter.”²³

(Source.)

[–] Cowbee@lemmy.ml 4 points 4 months ago

Thanks for doing the digging! All I could find is partial compliance, in not even repeating the name, but just the word "Minsk." I presume it may be capable of triangulation of some sort, but I don't know for sure, and the only source I found showed the Soviets refusing to fully comply with the request.

[–] ChairmanMeow@programming.dev -1 points 4 months ago

Nice dig! I found a Russian source which says the same: https://hrono.ru/sobyt/1900war/1939pol.php

So to clarify here, this is indeed used for navigation. At the time no GPS existed of course, so pilots had to rely on either radio signals or visual clues on the ground to tell them where they are. The radio signals, if the pilot could tell where they were coming from, would indeed help triangulate their location. Quite necessary, particularly in eastern Poland where German radio signals had a harder time reaching.

If the radio tower continually transmitted the requested callsign in between the other stuff, it would be easy to tell where the radio tower was. The Germans at this point expected the Soviets to help invade already as they had agreed upon. By mentioning "Minsk" a lot in the transmissions they effectively did the same thing, but a bit less overt. This allowed the Soviets to retain some element of surprise against the Poles.

On the 10th of September, the Nazis urged Molotov to begin the Soviet side of the invasion to uphold their end of the agreement, but Molotov held off due to the war with Japan. This gave them a convenient reason to wait until Polish resistance had been broken before going in. One week later, war was declared and the Soviets invaded.