cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/5230082
This is a Q&A session with Charles Burton, senior fellow at Sinopsis.cz and former diplomat at Canada’s embassy in Beijing. It's podacst with a transcript available at the linked site.
China is using economic coercion to pressure Canada on trade policy: Burton says Beijing has imposed arbitrary tariffs on Canadian canola exports—a $12 billion annual industry—in retaliation for Canada’s 100 percent tariff on Chinese EVs (electric vehicles).
Chinese EVs pose potential national security risks beyond just economic competition: These vehicles could serve as surveillance tools and contain software that could be remotely disabled during conflicts, similar to concerns raised about Huawei telecommunications equipment.
Any trade concessions to China will likely require sacrifices: Beijing expects Canada to “set aside differences” on issues like espionage investigations, a promised foreign agent registry, and support for Taiwan in exchange for market access.
China views Canada primarily as a raw materials supplier within its global strategy: Beijing’s approach aligns with Xi Jinping’s vision of remaking the world order, with China as the dominant civilizational force by 2050.
In the case of Canola, clearly Canada put too many, too much of our Canola into one market: Canada should be trying to diversify so that when China engages in arbitrary tariff measures to leverage on other issues, the country would be able take the hit more readily.
Xi Jinping now faces irregular internal challenges from China’s military leadership: Nine top military officials have been removed this month, suggesting potential concerns about China’s economic decline under Xi’s policies.
...
Charles Burton: ... [Imposing tariffs on Canadian canola is a significant] move by China to leverage us by using economic coercion because there are 40,000 prairie farmers involved in the production of canola seeds. And it’s a $12 billion a year business. And last year, before China imposed these punitive tariffs, we sold over 4 billion to China. So it’s a big, big market. The Chinese did this in retaliation for our imposing 100% tariff on electric vehicles. The reason that we did that was that China heavily subsidizes these things, and so they would devastate our own market if they came into Canada. It’s a superior product, better battery technology, much cheaper. But the other concern which I expressed in Parliament is the potential for espionage by these machines. They’re similar to Huawei Telecoms.
...
China won’t let the Teslas go anywhere near sensitive sites. I mean, they gather terrific amount of information of where they go and on the people who are driving them. And there’s also like the neptech technology that we decided not to use for scanners in Canadian embassies and consulates around the world, they have software updates which come from the manufacturer. So if there was conflict between Canada and China, it’s possible that, conceivable under current conditions, that China could cripple them. So we’d really have to address those serious issues before it would be a good idea to bring them in
...
If we do get them to take off the tariffs on the canola, it doesn’t solve the problem, because next time China wants to leverage us to prevent us from, say, expelling agents of espionage or other concerns over Taiwan or the South China Sea or, you know, any number of things that, that we have going on with China, they can simply engage in this economic coercion on something else. They could declare our pulp and paper products are dumped, for example. So when you have a country that doesn’t respect the agreements and, and falsifies some reasons for barring Canadian products from the Chinese market, it’s sort of like whack a mole. You saw one, it’s quite likely that they would use another.
...
And what they want back [in exchange for reducing tariffs on canola] is what they refer to as some seek common ground while setting aside differences. So they don’t want us to pursue Chinese espionage, you know, the transfer of dual use military technologies to the Chinese state. They definitely don’t want us to enact the Foreign Influence Registry that came into law in Canada in June 2024 with Bill C70.
...
China I think would like us to be a supplier of raw materials for China. They’d like access to our northern resources Their, you know, their idea of China being a near Arctic state and more and more present in the Northwest Passage, I think is a concern to us overall.
...
China is an integrated party state, industrial military complex ... it’s all dominated by the Chinese Communist Party, which some people say is like God invisible, but everywhere present. And so, you know, when we look at how China relates with Africa, countries that they’ve been investing in in the Belt and Road and supporting enabling dictators with surveillance technologies and so on, are typically countries that have favorable port facilities that China could use for future blue water, navy and submarines.
...
Within Canada, you see a similar process of China gradually attempting to achieve a comprehensive influence in our country.
Not just the elections, but, you know, the attempts to subvert policymakers and to have investment in Canada that they can then leverage for their geostrategic purposes. You know, would we continue to deny China access to mining resources in the north if they would respond by punishing us economically? So I think the key here is that we shouldn’t be too dependent on the Chinese export market. So in the case of Canola, clearly we put too many, too much of our Canola into one market. And we should be trying to diversify so that when China engages in arbitrary tariff measures to leverage on other issues, that we can take the hit more readily.
...