https://www.oglaf.com/grandmaster/

I'm going to grow my beard so long it covers my junk and then find a cave, and I'll knock down beehives with sticks and eat the honey while the bees sting me, and when local kids come and gawk at me I'll chase them away with a big rock screaming.

Yeah, that would be the life.

Source (Qwantz.com)

Her/she

Approximately 23,900 companies are expected to file for bankruptcy in 2025, an 8.3% increase from 2024 and the highest figure since 2014, according to a report by credit agency Creditreform.

This year's increase in insolvencies has been driven by a rise in cases among smaller companies, with micro-enterprises, of up to ten employees, accounting for the largest share - 81.6% this year, marginally higher than in 2024.

cross-posted from: https://slrpnk.net/post/31155841

Research from the Net Zero Industrial Policy Lab at Johns Hopkins University found that 75% of China's low-carbon foreign direct investment is in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

Southeast Asia remained the top destination for Chinese cleantech manufacturing investments, the CEF report found

The Middle East and North Africa were the fastest-growing investment destinations, driven by national strategies for diversifying away from oil.

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/43244142

A new joint assessment by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) and the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) aims to dispel any remaining scepticism among those who still fail to recognise the threat from Russia.

The document [is] not yet public ... The weekly newspaper Spiegel obtained a draft and outlined its main findings [links to article in German]. The 30‑page analysis details cases of disinformation, espionage, sabotage, subversion and political influence operations in Germany.

The study covers the period from July 2024 to June 2025, also examining the consequences of earlier incidents. In just the first six months of 2025, 143 suspected acts of sabotage were recorded – an upward trend.

...

“The central conclusion: Germany is at the heart of hybrid threats. They emanate not only from Russia, but above all from Russia,” Spiegel writes. The aim of hybrid operations is to foster a sense of insecurity and destabilise the state. The analysis suggests that various incidents that have shaken Germany form a chain of hybrid attacks either orchestrated or exploited by Russia.

A recent public hearing with all three German intelligence agencies likewise concluded that Russia is the primary actor behind sabotage and subversive activity in the country.

...

Another key finding: in planning acts of sabotage, Russia shows no hesitation in taking lives. One example concerns an attack in the logistics sector with links to Lithuania.

In July 2024, incendiary devices were sent by DHL aircraft from Lithuania to the UK and Germany. A major disaster was narrowly avoided: the parcels did not make it onto the intended aircraft because it was delayed. The devices ignited in DHL’s Leipzig warehouse instead.

Investigators believe so‑called single‑use agents – individuals recruited via channels such as Telegram and given limited information – were used in Lithuania and other countries to carry out such operations.

Low‑level agents, often drawn from the criminal underworld, are suspected in other cases too – including a 2024 attempt to cast a shadow over then Vice‑Chancellor Robert Habeck and his Green Party. Hundreds of exhaust pipes were clogged with expanding foam, and cars were plastered with stickers featuring Mr Habeck’s image. These actions are seen as an attempt to influence the Bundestag election campaign.

...

The report also identifies tools of political influence, such as the pro‑Russian platform Voice of Europe, through which pro‑Kremlin members of the European Parliament were allegedly financed. AfD MEP Petr Bystron is among those investigated over suspected payments from the portal.

Security agencies also point to the instrumentalisation of violent attacks on German society for propaganda purposes. After the fatal attack at Magdeburg’s Christmas market last December, Russian channels used the incident to discredit the German government and praise the AfD as a “positive alternative”, fuelling social tension and seeking to shift Germany’s political course.

...

A new joint assessment by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) and the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) aims to dispel any remaining scepticism among those who still fail to recognise the threat from Russia.

The document [is] not yet public ... The weekly newspaper Spiegel obtained a draft and outlined its main findings [links to article in German]. The 30‑page analysis details cases of disinformation, espionage, sabotage, subversion and political influence operations in Germany.

The study covers the period from July 2024 to June 2025, also examining the consequences of earlier incidents. In just the first six months of 2025, 143 suspected acts of sabotage were recorded – an upward trend.

...

“The central conclusion: Germany is at the heart of hybrid threats. They emanate not only from Russia, but above all from Russia,” Spiegel writes. The aim of hybrid operations is to foster a sense of insecurity and destabilise the state. The analysis suggests that various incidents that have shaken Germany form a chain of hybrid attacks either orchestrated or exploited by Russia.

A recent public hearing with all three German intelligence agencies likewise concluded that Russia is the primary actor behind sabotage and subversive activity in the country.

...

Another key finding: in planning acts of sabotage, Russia shows no hesitation in taking lives. One example concerns an attack in the logistics sector with links to Lithuania.

In July 2024, incendiary devices were sent by DHL aircraft from Lithuania to the UK and Germany. A major disaster was narrowly avoided: the parcels did not make it onto the intended aircraft because it was delayed. The devices ignited in DHL’s Leipzig warehouse instead.

Investigators believe so‑called single‑use agents – individuals recruited via channels such as Telegram and given limited information – were used in Lithuania and other countries to carry out such operations.

Low‑level agents, often drawn from the criminal underworld, are suspected in other cases too – including a 2024 attempt to cast a shadow over then Vice‑Chancellor Robert Habeck and his Green Party. Hundreds of exhaust pipes were clogged with expanding foam, and cars were plastered with stickers featuring Mr Habeck’s image. These actions are seen as an attempt to influence the Bundestag election campaign.

...

The report also identifies tools of political influence, such as the pro‑Russian platform Voice of Europe, through which pro‑Kremlin members of the European Parliament were allegedly financed. AfD MEP Petr Bystron is among those investigated over suspected payments from the portal.

Security agencies also point to the instrumentalisation of violent attacks on German society for propaganda purposes. After the fatal attack at Magdeburg’s Christmas market last December, Russian channels used the incident to discredit the German government and praise the AfD as a “positive alternative”, fuelling social tension and seeking to shift Germany’s political course.

...

We should use state ballot initiatives to amend the state constitutions of every state that has a ballot initiative process. All US House congressional districts have to have boundaries drawn by an independant non-partisan commision using the shortest splitline algorithm.

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/43242104

You can download the study here: No sense of safety under heaven

...

Beyond individual intimidation, the study highlights how these pro-China diaspora networks try to influence local politics. Community groups and lobbyists aligned with Beijing work to shape debates in foreign parliaments, cultivate alliances and strengthen what the author, Ray Wong, calls a “repressive nationalist diaspora.” Such efforts, the study warns, do more than target individuals: they erode basic rights and shift political environments in ways favorable to China’s foreign policy objectives.

...

Current [German] legislation does not yet clearly address harassment, coercion or intimidation carried out by non-state actors acting on behalf of a foreign government. As a result, some dissidents living in Germany - including Uyghur, Tibetan, Hong Kong and mainland Chinese activists - may face gaps in protection. Enhancing the legal framework, the study suggests, would help ensure that all individuals on German soil can fully rely on the country’s commitment to safeguarding fundamental rights.

...

The study acknowledges Germany’s strong emphasis on victim protection and crisis response, but notes that these efforts could be further strengthened through more robust preventive measures. Enhancing legal tools to address foreign-directed surveillance and harassment, it suggests, would help ensure that critics are better protected and that authorities are fully equipped to respond effectively.

...

The author also calls for a central coordinating authority to link intelligence services, law enforcement, foreign policy units and victim support agencies. Such coordination, the study suggests, would enable Germany to respond even more effectively to emerging challenges and align more closely with other democracies that are enhancing their approaches to foreign interference.

Ultimately the study serves as a stark reminder: the battleground over fundamental rights is no longer limited by geography. Taking proactive steps, it suggests, would not only strengthen Germany’s national security but also reinforce the country’s longstanding commitment to human rights and democracy at home.

You can download the study here: No sense of safety under heaven

...

Beyond individual intimidation, the study highlights how these pro-China diaspora networks try to influence local politics. Community groups and lobbyists aligned with Beijing work to shape debates in foreign parliaments, cultivate alliances and strengthen what the author, Ray Wong, calls a “repressive nationalist diaspora.” Such efforts, the study warns, do more than target individuals: they erode basic rights and shift political environments in ways favorable to China’s foreign policy objectives.

...

Current [German] legislation does not yet clearly address harassment, coercion or intimidation carried out by non-state actors acting on behalf of a foreign government. As a result, some dissidents living in Germany - including Uyghur, Tibetan, Hong Kong and mainland Chinese activists - may face gaps in protection. Enhancing the legal framework, the study suggests, would help ensure that all individuals on German soil can fully rely on the country’s commitment to safeguarding fundamental rights.

...

The study acknowledges Germany’s strong emphasis on victim protection and crisis response, but notes that these efforts could be further strengthened through more robust preventive measures. Enhancing legal tools to address foreign-directed surveillance and harassment, it suggests, would help ensure that critics are better protected and that authorities are fully equipped to respond effectively.

...

The author also calls for a central coordinating authority to link intelligence services, law enforcement, foreign policy units and victim support agencies. Such coordination, the study suggests, would enable Germany to respond even more effectively to emerging challenges and align more closely with other democracies that are enhancing their approaches to foreign interference.

Ultimately the study serves as a stark reminder: the battleground over fundamental rights is no longer limited by geography. Taking proactive steps, it suggests, would not only strengthen Germany’s national security but also reinforce the country’s longstanding commitment to human rights and democracy at home.

A must-read on the humanization of LLMs / chatbots

• Release Date: Dec 11
• Description: INK INSIDE is based on a lost cartoon pilot and features a deep-lore narrative, local couch co-op, weird loot that changes your abilities, some fart jokes, and a rich story with memorable characters like the “Princess of Cursing” and “Stick” the Stick figure - all fully voice acted by Brian David Gilbert (Dropout), Deneen Melody (Evangelion, Pokemon), Foot of a Ferret (YouTube), and more.
• Price: $9.99
• Link: https://www.nintendo.com/us/store/products/ink-inside-switch/
• Platform: Nintendo Switch

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.zip/post/54567014

Is it number of times the community page is requested? The number of users that post, comment, or vote? Or something else?

It would be nice to get separate posts per day and comments per day etc. to see in what ways a community is active.

Open valve in heating system affects 300 to 400 items just weeks after a brazen jewel theft raised security concerns

A water leak in late November damaged several hundred works in the Louvre’s Egyptian department, the Paris museum said on Sunday, weeks after a brazen jewel theft raised concerns over its infrastructure.

“Between 300 and 400 works” were affected by the leak discovered on 26 November, the museum’s deputy administrator, Francis Steinbock, said, describing them as “Egyptology journals” and “scientific documentation” used by researchers.

The damaged items dated from the late 19th and early 20th centuries and were “extremely useful” but “by no means unique”, Steinbock added.

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/43239009

Web archive link

Here are the documents (in Russian).

• After Russia launched its full-scale war against Ukraine, China decided to purchase Russian aircraft, combat vehicles, ammunition, and equipment to enhance its paratroopers.
• Chinese officers and representatives of defense manufacturers have repeatedly visited Russia to inspect examples of weaponry and negotiate deals.
• In 2023 and 2024, Beijing entered into several confidential contracts with Moscow to acquire Russian armaments, with the funds intended for Russian arms manufacturers being subject to international sanctions.
• The known deadline for implementing some of the contracts is 2027.
• The Kyiv Independent has identified several dozen Chinese military personnel and employees of arms manufacturers who continued to cooperate with the Russian arms industry, thereby violating international sanctions.

...

A little over a month after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian government received a request from China, according to leaked correspondence reviewed by the Kyiv Independent.

In it, Beijing asked to buy a set of weapons and armored vehicles for airborne troops. The request, numbered ZH2022-Y53, was received on April 7, 2022, the documents show.

Three weeks later, according to the documents, Russia's Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation instructed Rosoboronexport, the state-owned company responsible for all arms exports from Russia, to demonstrate Russian air-droppable combat vehicles to a Chinese delegation.

...

The agreements are set to provide sanctioned Russian arms manufacturers with revenue from the export of their weaponry to China. In return, China will receive weaponry and equipment for its airborne forces, the PLAAF Airborne Corps, which have been strengthening amid expectations of an attack on Taiwan.

...

A key element of the cooperation is the steady flow of Chinese officers and defense industry officials who have been traveling to Russia since 2023 for closed-door talks. By piecing together leaked Russian documents with photos and travel data, the Kyiv Independent was able to identify many of these previously anonymous visitors by name and rank.

Chinese Major General Fan Jianjun was photographed during his visit to the annual Russian arms forum in the Moscow suburbs in August 2023. He was pictured showing then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu models of Chinese weaponry.

Fan Jianjun represented China's highest military authority, the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China (PRC). In 2023, he led the Bureau of Military Equipment and Technical Cooperation within the Equipment Development Department of the PRC Central Military Commission.

The Bureau's procurement division purchases imported weapons and equipment for China, including from Russia.

None of the Russian media that covered the event mentioned who was in the photo next to Shoigu.

...

Web archive link

Here are the documents (in Russian).

• After Russia launched its full-scale war against Ukraine, China decided to purchase Russian aircraft, combat vehicles, ammunition, and equipment to enhance its paratroopers.
• Chinese officers and representatives of defense manufacturers have repeatedly visited Russia to inspect examples of weaponry and negotiate deals.
• In 2023 and 2024, Beijing entered into several confidential contracts with Moscow to acquire Russian armaments, with the funds intended for Russian arms manufacturers being subject to international sanctions.
• The known deadline for implementing some of the contracts is 2027.
• The Kyiv Independent has identified several dozen Chinese military personnel and employees of arms manufacturers who continued to cooperate with the Russian arms industry, thereby violating international sanctions.

...

A little over a month after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian government received a request from China, according to leaked correspondence reviewed by the Kyiv Independent.

In it, Beijing asked to buy a set of weapons and armored vehicles for airborne troops. The request, numbered ZH2022-Y53, was received on April 7, 2022, the documents show.

Three weeks later, according to the documents, Russia's Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation instructed Rosoboronexport, the state-owned company responsible for all arms exports from Russia, to demonstrate Russian air-droppable combat vehicles to a Chinese delegation.

...

The agreements are set to provide sanctioned Russian arms manufacturers with revenue from the export of their weaponry to China. In return, China will receive weaponry and equipment for its airborne forces, the PLAAF Airborne Corps, which have been strengthening amid expectations of an attack on Taiwan.

...

A key element of the cooperation is the steady flow of Chinese officers and defense industry officials who have been traveling to Russia since 2023 for closed-door talks. By piecing together leaked Russian documents with photos and travel data, the Kyiv Independent was able to identify many of these previously anonymous visitors by name and rank.

Chinese Major General Fan Jianjun was photographed during his visit to the annual Russian arms forum in the Moscow suburbs in August 2023. He was pictured showing then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu models of Chinese weaponry.

Fan Jianjun represented China's highest military authority, the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China (PRC). In 2023, he led the Bureau of Military Equipment and Technical Cooperation within the Equipment Development Department of the PRC Central Military Commission.

The Bureau's procurement division purchases imported weapons and equipment for China, including from Russia.

None of the Russian media that covered the event mentioned who was in the photo next to Shoigu.

...

IN FEBRUARY 2024, without warning, YouTube deleted the account of independent British journalist Robert Inlakesh.

His YouTube page featured dozens of videos, including numerous livestreams documenting Israel’s military occupation of the West Bank. In a decade covering Palestine and Israel, he had captured video of Israeli authorities demolishing Palestinian homes, police harassing Palestinian drivers, and Israeli soldiers shooting at Palestinian civilians and journalists during protests in front of illegal Israeli settlements. In an instant, all of that footage was gone.

In July, YouTube deleted Inlakesh’s private backup account. And in August, Google, YouTube’s parent company, deleted his Google account, including his Gmail and his archive of documents and writings.

The tech giant initially claimed Inlakesh’s account violated YouTube’s community guidelines. Months later, the company justified his account termination by alleging his page contained spam or scam content.

However, when The Intercept inquired further about Inlakesh’s case, nearly two years after his account was deleted, YouTube provided a separate and wholly different explanation for the termination: a connection to an Iranian influence campaign.