Australia

In short:

TPG Telecom has confirmed a customer in Sydney died last week after a mobile phone could not make Triple Zero calls.

The telco says early investigations indicated the failed calls were due to a Samsung device operating on software that was not compatible with making Triple Zero calls on the network.

Samsung said on its website it had identified older mobile devices that do not "correctly connect to an alternative mobile network to make Triple Zero calls when the user's primary network is not available".

The company lists on its website dozens of devices that need to be updated or replaced to ensure users can make Triple Zero calls.

Archived

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Ultra cheap e-commerce platforms Temu and fast fashion brand Shein are selling products made from Chinese cotton despite the high risk of links to slavery.

More than 80 per cent of Chinese cotton is produced in the Xinjiang province where an estimated more than 800,000 Uighurs are enslaved.

This masthead has seen multiple examples of cotton products made in China available for sale on Temu and Shein, including clothing and bedding.

Australian Human Rights Institute director Justine Nolan said there was a heightened risk of slavery with any cotton products made in China.

“You just couldn’t say the risk is low when you’ve got over 80 per cent of cotton coming from Xinjiang,” she said. “That’s a high risk.”

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China produces about 20 per cent of the world’s cotton, with about 84 per cent coming from the Xinjiang province. The US banned cotton from the Xinjiang province in 2022 under the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.

Ms Nolan said retailers and manufacturers would need to ascertain whether the cotton was produced in China or was sourced from a supply chain outside of China.

“The reality of actually finding that out is very difficult,” she said. “There’s a heightened risk for any cotton products coming out of China that they are tainted by forced labour.”

Conversely, Ms Nolan said Australia had a very strong cotton industry. “I would say cotton coming out of Australia is a hell of a lot safer than cotton coming out of China.”

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The Australian Ministry of Education has confirmed the number of schools and early learning centres in contact over asbestos-contamination concerns has doubled - with seven closing.

Operations and integration lead Sean Teddy said five early learning services and two schools would close temporarily to allow licensed asbestos removalists to address possible contamination.

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New Zealand's Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) has also urged people to stop using the sand and arrange for safe disposal "through licensed professionals".

In New Zealand, the Ministry of Education said on Friday that five early learning services and two schools would close temporarily while licensed professionals addressed possible asbestos contamination, the country's RNZ reported.

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Importing or exporting asbestos or goods containing asbestos is prohibited under both Australian and New Zealand law. Asbestos becomes dangerous when breathed in and can damage the lungs and cause diseases including cancer.

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The BBC reports that the sand products were imported from China into Australia.

[As a personal note by OP: This is about Australia, but it perfectly applies to any democracy on the globe as well imho.]

Warnings this week from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) about sabotage threats marked an important shift in tone.

And they raise important questions about how the Australian government should respond.

Breaking from past practice, ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess said Chinese state-linked hackers have scanned, mapped and in some cases infiltrated Australian critical infrastructure.

According to Burgess, these groups are no longer focused on stealing information. They are preparing to disrupt or shut down key systems in a future crisis.

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Burgess described [that] this threat does not involve persuasion or interference in debate. It is about the ability to disable telecommunications, shut down water systems, interrupt electricity supplies or damage the financial system.

This is preparation to use coercion during a crisis. One can imagine a scenario where Australia’s ability to respond to a blockade or invasion of Taiwan is hampered by a shutdown of critical infrastructure.

Burgess is therefore right to highlight the seriousness of the threat. China has shown that control of digital systems is central to geopolitical competition. Maintaining access to foreign infrastructure is a strategic advantage. As Australia becomes more reliant on digital networks, weaknesses in those systems become national security concerns.

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There is, however, a second issue that deserves attention. In responding to foreign cyber threats, Australia risks adopting some of the very same digital tools used in authoritarian states such as Russia and China.

Research on digital authoritarianism shows that many authoritarian governments use control of digital networks to manage their own populations. They monitor citizens, limit information and use technology to enforce political order.

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Burgess’ warning suggests this model is being exported. The aim is to control digital life at home, but also to gain the ability to interfere with digital systems overseas if needed.

In recent years, Australian governments have proposed measures that go well beyond traditional cybersecurity. These include mandatory age checks for social media, strict online limits for minors and expanding the duties of technology companies to assist with national security goals.

These proposals are framed as necessary for public safety. Yet they show a willingness to extend state power deeper into digital life.

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Burgess’ speech at a business conference reinforces this trend. He addressed government agencies but also corporate boards, telling them national security is now their responsibility, as well.

Much of Australia’s critical infrastructure is owned or operated by private companies. Expecting these companies to act as extensions of national security policy risks blurring the line between public and private roles.

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A defining feature of digital authoritarianism is the merger of state security priorities with corporate behaviour. If this boundary weakens, Australia could slowly move toward practices it has long opposed.

It is possible to strengthen national resilience without taking this path. A democratic society can defend its networks and deter cyber threats while maintaining openness and accountability.

Burgess is correct that Australia faces a serious and evolving challenge. China’s cyber operations reflect wider geopolitical changes. But an effective response requires protecting both infrastructure and democratic norms.

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Stronger cyber defences are necessary, but they must come with clear limits on state power, transparent rules for data access and protections for speech.

China’s cyber operations, which are part of a wider strategic contest, are indeed a serious threat. But if Australia reacts by expanding security powers without restraint, it risks weakening the freedoms it aims to defend.

Archived

Manila and Canberra are preparing to sign a new defense agreement that will grant expanded mutual military access and rights on each other’s soil. This signals not only deeper cooperation but also a shared anxiety over China’s increasingly aggressive behavior, including in the South China Sea. The forthcoming pact, which is expected to be finalized next year, follows a Statement of Intent on Enhanced Defense Cooperation that was signed in August by Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. and Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles in Manila. The deal will include the development of defense infrastructure in the Philippines, with eight projects planned across five undisclosed locations.

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While careful not to overstate the move, the subtext was clear. “China’s behavior, as a whole, is becoming more assertive and as China’s military power has grown, it’s become more confident in how it uses that military capability in the region,” one of the officials said. Its aggressiveness has also gone beyond the South China Sea, they said. “While we see that the People’s Liberation Army are operating in the South China Sea, it is also occurring simply into the Southwest Pacific. We increasingly see PLA assets operating and also out into the Indian Ocean,” one of the officials said, mentioning the PLA naval task group that conducted a full circle around the Australian continent and also conducted a live-fire exercise in the oceans between Australia and New Zealand early this year.

The partnership of the two Indo-Pacific nations builds on an already extensive framework of defense accords, including the Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA), which for years made Australia the only country other than the United States to enjoy that level of military access to the Philippines. In the last two years, however, Manila has rapidly expanded that circle to include Japan, New Zealand, and most recently, Canada. Similar talks are also underway with France and will soon start with the United Kingdom. This recalibration of the Philippines’ defense posture reflects the increasingly volatile nature of the maritime environment. The Philippines sits at the frontline of regional power competition. Its geography makes it a potential flashpoint in both the South China Sea and any future Taiwan contingency. Strengthening its defense posture, therefore, serves the bigger goal of maintaining a “free and open” Indo-Pacific – a principle that is among Australia’s national core interests.

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Australia's spy chief says hackers linked to the Chinese government and military are targeting the country's critical infrastructure, warning the country was increasingly at risk of "high-impact sabotage".

Mike Burgess, head of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (Asio), said "unprecedented levels of espionage" meant a growing threat of "cyber-enabled sabotage" in the next five years.

He singled out "one nation state - no prizes for guessing which one - conducting multiple attempts to scan and penetrate critical infrastructure in Australia" and its allies, "targeting water, transport, telecommunications, and energy networks".

The Chinese embassy has been contacted for comment.

Authoritarian regimes were now more willing to "disrupt and destroy," Burgess warned.

He cited two Chinese hacking groups, Salt Typhoon and Volt Typhoon, who have targeted telecommunications companies in the US and Australia.

"These groups are hackers working for Chinese government intelligence and their military," he told business leaders at a forum in Melbourne on Wednesday.

"Both groups were involved in the theft of sensitive information, but the real danger was the threat of sabotage - disruption to critical infrastructure."

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