this post was submitted on 02 Oct 2026
85 points (96.7% liked)

Programming

28764 readers
452 users here now

Welcome to the main community in programming.dev! Feel free to post anything relating to programming here!

Cross posting is strongly encouraged in the instance. If you feel your post or another person's post makes sense in another community cross post into it.

Hope you enjoy the instance!

Rules

Rules

  • Follow the programming.dev instance rules
  • Keep content related to programming in some way
  • If you're posting long videos try to add in some form of tldr for those who don't want to watch videos

Wormhole

Follow the wormhole through a path of communities !webdev@programming.dev



founded 3 years ago
MODERATORS
 

In a well-fleshed-out post, Scott Chacon shows how unneecessary Git 3.0's move to replace SHA-1 with SHA-256 is.

you are viewing a single comment's thread
view the rest of the comments
[–] into_highest_invite@lemmygrad.ml 2 points 1 week ago* (last edited 1 week ago)

I pull it from there because I trust that GitHub has its authentication game together enough that it's unlikely that anyone malicious...

i don't. more importantly, my package manager doesn't. that is, every package manager i can think of references git commit hashes in its build system. the end user trusts that when they build from commit xxxxxxxx, they're getting the exact same code as everyone else. what exactly is being signed in these build systems i don't know, but whatever scott or linus or anyone else wishes would happen, in the real world, commit hashes are a part of the trust chain.

then again, a lot of package managers just use tags. so maybe in practice, they do trust microsoft.