Astonishingly, the private keys were 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237.
exploiting compromised certificates requires an active adversary-in-the-middle attack, meaning the attacker must act as a proxy between two TLS parties and receive encrypted traffic, decrypt it, reencrypt it, and send it to the other party. Such capabilities, in some cases, are usually limited to only the most well-resourced attackers. People with control of a local network—at a coffee shop, university, or other organization—face much less of a challenge.
https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/
Ok, but what would that look like in a way that would have mitigated this situation? Seems likely that such a system could actually exacerbate this specific scenario.
Something like DANE, maybe? Only the websites actually using the compromised certificates would be compromised.
Conceptually, I get it. Esepecially if you go with the 'DNS pinning of CA' to have a 'belt and suspenders' approach where two chains of authority must be broken, one of which inherently tied to your name.
Practically speaking, DNSSEC hasn't managed to get ubiquitous adoption. To the point where browsers started giving up and doing DNS over HTTPS to well known providers instead.