UK's Secret Intelligence Service MI6 is right to warn about Russia’s campaign of petty sabotage against the West. The goal is to disrupt and distract.
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Three Bulgarians [painting] red hands on Paris’s Holocaust Memorial ... An arson attack on an Ikea store in Vilnius, vandalising phone towers in Sweden and hacking the Czech railway operator, all in the past 12 months. Moscow has unleashed its intelligence agencies to carry out what seem petty incidents of sabotage. The International Institute for Strategic Studies has recorded at least 67 such incidents since 2022 in countries all over Europe thought to be linked to Russia.
Although attribution is often difficult, and some incidents will have nothing to do with Russia, it is clear that Putin’s regime is conducting a campaign of disruption and destruction in Europe. [UK's Spy chief Blaise] Metreweli called this “export of chaos” ... to divide, distract and dismay the West.
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There has been something of a shift in Russia’s campaign in recent years. In the past, the focus was on disinformation and amplifying disruptive political messages. Unlike the USSR, Putin’s Russia is essentially post-ideological. It can thus be all things to all people, and promote every useful message — from hard-right migrant alarmism to hard-left anticapitalism; regional secessionism to blood and soil nationalism; Black Lives Matter to the National Rifle Association.
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Sometimes, there are clear practical benefits for Moscow, such as the placing of cameras along Polish railway lines on which aid to Ukraine flows. (The cameras were discovered by railway staff and six people were arrested in 2023.) In other cases, operations are still about heightening division in society: the red-hand graffiti in Paris, for example, was used by Russian disinformation outlets to paint France as a haven for antisemitism.
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Moscow’s goal now seems to be to start to make people feel that their country’s support for Ukraine affects them directly. A [UK intel] GCHQ analyst, for example, told me of apparent efforts to temporarily degrade internet bandwidth, noting that “it may sound trivial, but think of the annoyance if you can’t do your online banking, or the film you wanted to download takes hours buffering”.
No one will go to war because their train is delayed or their phone signal wobbly — but they might begin to think twice about supporting another country’s war if the toll of inconveniences begins to mount. It also contributes to another Kremlin (and, indeed, Chinese) talking point, that degenerate western democracies simply don’t work.
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One of the reasons it is so difficult to resist and prepare for these attacks is their very variety. In May 2024, a German arms factory was gutted in a blaze the authorities blamed on Russian agents. In July 2024, improvised explosives hidden inside electric massagers detonated in DHL logistics hubs in Germany, Poland and the UK. The next month, mysterious break-ins on military bases in Germany prompted fears that water supplies had been tainted.
On Christmas Day last year, an ageing tanker leaving a Russian port seems to have dragged its anchors across the Estlink 2 underwater power cable between Estonia and Finland, cutting it. Last month Polish railway lines were cut by a bomb, and in recent weeks, what were described as “military-style drones” shadowed President Zelensky’s jet as he flew to Dublin.
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This also highlights another virtue of this new strategy for the Kremlin: it encourages and mobilises our own paranoia. Many of the alleged “Russian drones” which shut down airports across Europe in the autumn turned out either to be nothing to do with Russia — or not even to be drones at all. Once people were on their guard, though, they began seeing drones everywhere, and risk-averse airport operators duly shut down flights as soon as a report came in .... A Polish diplomat put it starkly: “The Kremlin has learned that it cannot get Europe to like it, so it hopes to force concessions on us by making us fear it.”
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One striking characteristic of the attacks to date has been that they tend to come in waves, followed by periods of relative calm, with little real connection to the military or political situation. The concern in some intelligence circles is that this is still a campaign at its “beta testing” phase — that after each spate of attacks, the Russians regroup and consider the lessons.
“It’s when they think they know what works best,” one British security official speculated, “that we might see them ready for a serious, sustained challenge.”
Nor is it a challenge likely to end if and when there is peace in Ukraine. With the White House now seen as a potential partner, Russian propaganda has pivoted to seeing Europe as its main enemy given its continued support for Kyiv. We may well have to cope with such attacks as long as Putin is in the Kremlin.
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In many ways, the best, if less exciting response is to go back to how Europe coped with political terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s: foiling as many plots as possible, but accepting that some would inevitably succeed. The answer was — and is — not to let that panic us or force a change in policy: to keep calm and carry on.