AlHouthi4President

joined 9 months ago
 
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Founding Pedos (lemmy.ml)
submitted 2 months ago* (last edited 2 months ago) by AlHouthi4President@lemmy.ml to c/memes@lemmy.ml
 
 

"Ummm aktshually Maduro stole the election see the wiki article..."

 
 

Sudan, once envisioned as the Arab world’s breadbasket, now faces one of the gravest famines of the century. The IPC Special Snapshot for September 2025 to May 2026 confirms famine in El Fasher and Kadugli, warning that catastrophic hunger is spreading and affecting more than 25 million people. This crisis, however, is not merely a product of the war that began in April 2023. It is the culmination of a decades-long structural shift: the systematic reorientation of Sudan’s fertile land and water toward export-oriented agriculture serving Gulf food-security systems, weakening the country’s own ability to feed its population.

The war devastated agriculture, driving 2023-2024 cereal production to near-disaster levels- 46% below the previous year and 41% below the five-year average. While field surveys in late 2024 and mid-2025 showed a partial rebound to 6.7 million tonnes harvested in 2024- more than 60% above the disastrous 2023 season and slightly above the five-year average- this recovery, however, did not reach the Sudanese population. Entire farming regions have emptied, markets have collapsed, and militia control of trade routes, combined with fuel shortages, soaring prices, displacement and blocked humanitarian access, has prevented food from moving within the country. More critically, smallholder agriculture, once the backbone of Sudan’s food supply, has been systematically displaced by the expansion of vast, foreign-controlled export concessions.

This structural transformation has been facilitated by successive governments for years. They offered long leases, tax exemptions, and access to irrigation networks to attract Gulf investment. Framed as development opportunities, these measures strengthened external food-security systems while redirecting fertile land toward export agriculture. Several studies show how weak contracts, limited oversight, and political instability allowed foreign companies to entrench themselves. The risks posed by large-scale land acquisitions to local food security have been documented by United Nations agencies since at least 2011. Yet from the late Bashir era through the transitional government into the current war, no effective protections were implemented. As the state fractured after 2023, these vulnerabilities deepened, allowing foreign control foreign control to expand further and embedding Sudan’s agricultural system within external demand rather than domestic need.

For Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Sudan offered what they lacked: abundant water, fertile soil, and scale. As domestic aquifers dried and grain cultivation became unsustainable at home, Gulf states built an external food-security architecture anchored in farmland abroad. Sudan became central to this strategy due to its proximity to Gulf markets and its large tracts of irrigable land.

Emirati firms control vast tracts of irrigated farmland. The conglomerate International Holding Company (IHC) cultivates more than 50,000 hectares devoted to fodder and export crops. Projects such as the Abu Hamad “turn the desert green”, a roughly $225 million joint venture between Abu Dhabi’s Royal Group and Sudan’s DAL Group, cover more than 100,000 hectares, with plans for further expansion. Production is supported by massive irrigation canals drawn from the Nile and geared toward Emirati consumption. These farms sit within a larger Emirati economic footprint exceeding $6 billion, spanning investments in Sudan’s foreign reserves, agricultural expansion, and port infrastructure.

Critically, the UAE has worked to ensure that crops from these lands can flow out of Sudan regardless of internal collapse. Abu Dhabi has pursued strategic port investments and established shipping routes such as the RSX1 service, which directly links Port Sudan to Jebel Ali in the UAE and Jeddah in Saudi Arabia. This infrastructure creates dedicated export corridors that bypass shattered domestic markets. Sudan functions as a crucial node in a much wider UAE strategy. Emirati firms, notably DP World and AD Ports Group, currently operate or hold concessions in about a dozen port facilities across Africa, securing long-term control over key maritime infrastructure that connects production zones to global supply chains.

This agricultural and logistical footprint exists alongside a parallel, militarized strategy to secure assets. While the UAE’s backing of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has been widely linked to securing gold flows, it also functions to protect broader economic corridors through which agricultural commodities from UAE-controlled farms must travel.

Saudi Arabia maintains a quieter presence but follows a similar logic of externalization. Its engagement has historically been more formal, slower-moving, and state-led than the UAE’s, yet it is grounded in the same long-term objective: securing fodder and feed crops abroad. The kingdom’s state-owned Saudi Agricultural and Livestock Investment Company (SALIC) announced plans to obtain Sudanese land for fodder under its external food-security program. The National Agricultural Development Company (NADEC), one of the Gulf’s major agribusiness firms, lists 3,200 hectares of Sudanese farmland dedicated to feed production. Although these records predate the war and remain smaller in scale than Emirati ventures, they illustrate a consistent pattern: Sudan’s agricultural capacity is redirected toward supplying feed crops that Saudi Arabia no longer produces domestically, embedding Sudan into the kingdom’s external agricultural supply chain.

 

The ultra-Zionist cult Chabad and its complicity in genocide in Gaza

Excerpt:

Chabad is an ultra-orthodox Jewish cult. It has many adherents in the genocidal Israeli occupation forces. Many of them wear Chabad patches on their uniforms. Here is a Zionist tank flying the distinctive Chabad flag in Gaza.

spoiler

In addition, there are also Chabad Rabbis attached to the Israeli occupation forces. One notes that the genocide is actually about “rooting out evil”. Here two Chabad Rabbis erected the Jewish religious symbol, the Menorah, in Gaza.

But what is Chabad? It styles itself as a friendly outgoing Jewish movement dedicated to helping Jews reconnect with Judaism. However, in reality, it is a supremacist, hate-mongering Zionist cult.

In the past it was anti-Zionist, but back then, even as far back as 1929, its adherents in Al Khalil (or Hebron as it is called by Zionists) were involved in spying on the Palestinians for the Haganah terror militia as well as storing weapons for them.

Chabad is now so ultra-Zionist that it called in December for Gaza to be recolonized with Jewish settlers. Worse, Israeli newspaper Haaretz reports, its adherents believe - as laid out in the Tanya, Chabad’s key religious text - gentiles have only animal souls, not human souls.

In January, the Tanya was printed out by the Israeli occupation forces in Gaza. This supremacism is carried over into its attitude to the Palestinians.

Followers of a Chabad Rabbi Yitzchak Ginsburgh are known as the ‘hilltop youth’. Two of his followers wrote the hugely controversial King Torah, which was also recommended by Ginsburg.

The book states that it is permissible to kill Palestinian children, including babies.

....

 

The sight of the Palestinian flag in Western geography—specifically in areas that do not even recognise Palestine’s right to exist—becomes a kind of optical illusion. This sight may spark a form of childlike excitement or curiosity, but, ultimately, it’s just a patching over of an erasure that is still taking place, a patching over that’s presented as solidarity in the imperial capitals. I do not mean to imply that this solidarity [the act of raising the flag] is inherently meaningless or a kind of “conspiracy”, but rather I’m trying to frame it within the context of the movement’s action of raising the flag and the conditions attached to it. These conditions often lead us into contracts of conditional solidarity that we may not even have realised we signed up for in the first place.

The discourse surrounding Palestine in the Global North varies widely, with academic, media, and social-political movements framing Palestine as a central moral issue, a point of shared concern, or an opportunity to strip the label of “colonialism” from their works. These entities, often indirectly, state: “We may be the beneficiaries of wealth derived from colonial enterprises, but we are trying, as part of that effort, to stand with Palestine.” The act of solidarity itself becomes a simulation—perhaps even a simulation of a simulation—that bears no connection to reality. Solidarity becomes disconnected not with the intent to distort reality but rather to avoid confronting reality altogether. This act aligns with the assumption that the Palestinian, at their core, is a victim, and, at times, a resister.

This situation is not the result of a deliberate plan or malice but is, instead, the culmination of unaddressed contradictions. Questions about the nature of “Western” solidarity with Palestine have rarely gone beyond enquiries about intentions. Contrary to all expectations, the dynamics of solidarity have been shaped around receiving and accepting all forms of compassionate solidarity, even when these forms are inherently harmful. In this essay, however, I want to explore whether it is possible for us, not only to reverse this relationship, but to place conditions on those who wish to stand in solidarity, rather than positioning ourselves according to their terms.

Reconstructing Palestinian Identity within the Context of “Solidarity Movements”

“Representation” remains the central characteristic of conditional solidarity, regardless of the Western capital where it is held. There is a persistent need to “hear the Palestinian voice”; this voice is brought in as a backdrop, placed as a decoration to enhance the credibility of the person standing in solidarity and is used during any attack on their right to do so. Perhaps the Palestinian voice is the least metaphorical in this representation, and so the content of solidarity becomes nothing more than: “What so-and-so says is …” or “What so-and-so is striving to say is …” Here, “so-and-so” could be any one of us—people, not ideas. Of course, the legitimacy of the individual and the ability of the Western ally to quote them is directly tied to how easily their words align with anti-colonial literature. It’s also tied to what extent the ally can “reinterpret” these words to fit within the limits of their own solidarity, which, in turn, is constrained by the laws of their own country.

It becomes easy to use the language of victimhood—not necessarily the language of grievance but sometimes one that insists we are not victims without ever truly telling us who we are. In other words, this is a language that strips away everything practical and real; the Palestinian becomes just a passive recipient whose words have no meaning unless they are framed within anger or other uncontrollable emotions. For example, resistance is reduced to a term to be used during moments of anger—always in a defensive context, never in the context of offense or aggression. As such, the Palestinian cause, in its entirety, becomes defined only in moments of death and so continues to be erased. Palestinian existence can only be framed through the position of the victim, either through the erasure of life (i.e., stripping resistance of its meaning) or by denying their existence altogether (i.e., the Palestinian is merely a victim).

The distortion of identity runs rampant within Western solidarity movements, and one might momentarily think this is solely linked to the discourse of victimhood. But sometimes, out of sheer fear of failing in their solidarity, they inject their discourse with elements of legend-making. In this sense, Palestinians are portrayed as symbols of what resistance means to them. Western solidarity movements often lean on various metaphors, such as the image of the “lone resister” with no support or the resister who passes all their strange moral tests—like being an environmentalist and simultaneously fighting occupation and climate change. As a result, we ourselves become appropriated by those attempting to “explain” our existence. Our cause becomes nothing more than a social metaphor for their issues, a life that exists far from the frustrations of their bureaucratic “political organisations”. Through this framing, resistance—which they have stripped of its essence through the language of victimhood—becomes chaos, and they, in their total incapacity to support the resistance, see it as an incomprehensible complexity that no one can truly understand. We are then left with nothing but its abstraction: either as a victim or as a legend.

We [Palestinians] drown in their emotions towards our existence, in their anxieties and feelings of impotence, and in their daydreams of a “free” world. We freeze in this frame, as if time is suspended for us based on the Western left’s decisions. If they decide that our liberation is coming tomorrow, we become more active, we are placed in their discussion panels, and our interviews—conducted by those of us who speak progressive English—are circulated. We become the central cause for them all. However, when they tire of their impotence or shift focus to local concerns, we are sidelined, reduced to just another item on an endless “checklist” of issues the world should care about.

This leads to the inevitable comparison of the Palestinian cause with other issues, such as Black Lives Matter versus Palestinian Lives Matter—a comparison that inevitably overlooks the material contexts of each but might appear as a nice aesthetic for the white guilt-ridden self. Notably, critiques of such comparisons—often by Western voices, too—tend to echo purely academic arguments that lack real substance, like: “Did you know that much of Palestinian society is also racist? So, these causes can’t be compared!” These critiques are often framed as acts of “self-criticism” [even when this “self-criticism” is not necessarily coming from Palestinians themselves]. It seems that we are only allowed to engage in such critique or self-critique when it aligns with Western frameworks of solidarity. In this sense, what appears as self-criticism is actually just another example of reshaping Palestinian identity to fit the limits of the solidarity they are willing to extend.

Some solidarity movements do not explicitly state their political stance on the Zionist occupation—or even name it at all—and lack any historical or everyday understanding of what resistance to occupation and settlement entails. They lack an understanding of the wider region [the Middle East] within which the occupation has chosen its centre and also lack any link to the Arab region’s struggles with colonialism. In such solidarity movements, the Palestinian struggle—and identity, by extension—becomes a “melodrama” that is subject to interpretation according to the “granter of solidarity”. Our struggle is reduced to nothing more than what appears to be an attempt to engage with their “frustrations” with Western social movements and an expression of transient political dissatisfaction. Here, we become a commodity for use, consumption, and observation without us engaging in any actual politically productive cross-border action.

The Terms of Conditional Solidarity In this context, we are presented with conditions to our solidarity. These conditions begin with the simple rule that we must not violate any of the laws of European constitutions: do not support “terrorist groups” and commit to nonviolence, even in cases of self-defence. The very existence of these two conditions is enough to show that the acts of solidarity mentioned earlier are nothing more than theatrics and are completely meaningless. None of us can genuinely reflect the reality we speak or write about, nor can we remain loyal to our people and to what Palestinians who have chosen to believe in resistance movements hold dear.

To be Palestinian within the framework of solidarity means to be Palestinian culturally, and at times politically, but only under the condition that we quote Frantz Fanon, for example, and claim to support boycotting Israeli products. Yet we are not allowed to reject being in shared spaces with “leftist” settlers who have decided to oppose the occupation on the basis that they are against the “Israeli Government”. We are also not allowed to say that our realities as Palestinians are fundamentally different, and so, in that one moment, we must represent all Palestinians. But this representation comes with a pre-written script: We are Palestinians who oppose the occupation, We wish to return to our land, No more violence, Let’s build cross-border movements, Let’s liberate each other tomorrow. The problem is this script omits the obvious questions: Which land are we talking about? What occupation? Who is the criminal? And do these cross-border movements inherently believe in our right to bear arms, for instance?

This script—that reproduces conditional solidarity—misleads people. They are enchanted by words that might seem, for a moment, akin to liberation movements of the 1970s, along with the material support those movements received and the solidarity that existed then. However, the difference now seems to lie mainly in how these movements define themselves. There is a vast difference between the terms “solidarity movements” and “liberation movements”. The latter ties its future and existence to you, requires you to sacrifice and risk what you have, and sometimes even enlists you to resist together. Whereas solidarity is confined to those who have the privilege of thinking about you in their universities, wishing to grant you some of their “consciousness”, perhaps writing about you later to benefit while you struggle for the right to exist under the very systems that fund their thinking. The distinction between solidarity and liberation movements is not one that can be easily settled, especially since it is often analysed through the lenses of identity (i.e., who the solidarity participants are and with whom they stand in solidarity), of their radicalism, or of their proximity to radical ideologies (which are not necessarily left wing). Even so, this does not lessen the necessity and importance of understanding the difference between the two.

Solidarity movements often focus on shared identities, common experiences, or common values in the context of liberal identity, but these movements often operate within the current systems and models that originally created these identities. Therefore, in the context of Palestine, solidarity becomes complicated by the fact that the Zionist entity is based on the idea of erasure.

 

cross-posted from: https://freefree.ps/users/faab64/statuses/115627174071013665

The fact this not on the front page of every newspaper in the world shows that
- Racism is stronger than war crime
- Israel can't be portrayed as guilty in any major crimes
- They are not allowed to post such stories
- All of the above
#israel #WarCrime #Occupation #Media #WestBank #Palestine #Hypocrisy

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/west-bank-israeli-forces-execute-two-palestinians-point-blank-range

@palestine@lemmy.ml
@palestine@fedibird.com

[–] AlHouthi4President@lemmy.ml 4 points 4 months ago

Awesome report thanks

[–] AlHouthi4President@lemmy.ml 10 points 4 months ago (1 children)

An article that seems relevant: https://metras.co/%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A8-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%9F/

"The Holocaust and Nazism.. Why are we playing in the enemy's home court?"

For over two years, Palestinians in Gaza have been screaming, "We are being annihilated," as Israel’s war machine turned their bodies into a stage for the brutal theater of colonial violence. Meanwhile, the international community has deliberately plugged its ears against the Palestinian cry. Even after two full years of atrocities, numerous international institutions still hesitate to classify Israel’s actions in Gaza as genocide.

Thus, a Palestinian is not permitted to name their own death unless the international community grants approval. A Palestinian tragedy only becomes “real” after it passes through the ethical frameworks of international institutions—after these bodies assign it an appropriate label, which usually fails to reflect the full truth of what occurred, and which emerges only after a sluggish institutional process involving assessment, verification, data collection, waiting for the “right” agency, and reliance on the “credible source” or the “neutral expert” to finally study the case and decide what to call it. Only then might Palestinian suffering gain some measure of legitimacy.

In an effort to wage the media war and solidify the Palestinian narrative, Palestinian resistance factions—led by Hamas—have sought to frame events in Gaza by invoking one of the most powerful historical metaphors in the Western imagination: the Nazi Holocaust. Yet, within anti-colonial struggle, terminology itself becomes a battlefield laden with strategic challenges—a reality this article seeks to clarify.

Is it useful to compare our death to theirs?

At first glance, the resistance’s rhetorical approach seems logical: spokespersons aim to provoke the Western collective memory by invoking the privileged moral status the Jewish Holocaust and Nazism hold in Western ethical discourse. They hope this will translate into public pressure on Western governments to end the suffering in Gaza.

Two full years of genocide have passed—and this has not happened. Why?

World War II serves as a foundational reference point in Western liberal thought and forms the ethical bedrock of its moral discourse, with the Holocaust at its core. Through epistemic hegemony, the West has succeeded in imposing its own ethical standards, defining condemned behaviors, and establishing the very foundations of “humanity.” Consequently, our global conception of ethics has become distinctly Eurocentric. Despite the fact that the Holocaust is not an unprecedented event in history—given that the very same Western colonial powers have perpetrated countless genocides, famines, and massacres against colonized peoples—the Holocaust has been elevated as the ultimate benchmark for an atrocity that must “never happen again.”

Conversely, using the term “Holocaust” as a point of comparison reveals two key issues. First, it implies that Palestinians do not see their tragedy as self-evident, but only through the lens of another people’s suffering—and not just any suffering, but specifically the tragedy that Western powers have chosen as the archetypal “tragedy,” as if all others never occurred. This reinforces the authority of a moral order that deliberately turns a deaf ear to Palestinian pain and inherently privileges Western trauma.

In other words, invoking the Holocaust tells Western audiences: “Believe us, because what is happening to us resembles your own history.” This perpetuates the notion that Western pain is the universal reference for all suffering—and that any other pain must be measured against it to gain credibility, recognition, and empathy. At its core, this undermines the legitimacy of the Palestinian historical experience and subordinates it to the very Western moral framework that Palestinians claim to resist in both word and deed.

Second, using the Holocaust and Nazism to underscore the horror of Gaza and the crimes of the Israeli occupation automatically positions the Gaza genocide as “lesser.” This is because the comparison relies on a scale pre-engineered to ensure the Holocaust always surpasses any other atrocity. The resistance’s rhetoric, in this instance, overlooks the sacralized status the Holocaust occupies in the Western collective imagination—a status safeguarded by hundreds of millions of dollars invested in museums, stories, narratives, films, and other representations. This has rendered the Nazi Holocaust an event that nothing else can possibly equal. Thus, invoking the Holocaust as a comparison implicitly accepts an unspoken condition: that nothing can be worse than Nazi crimes—not even what is happening in Gaza—and therefore what occurs in Gaza cannot truly be “genocide.”

[–] AlHouthi4President@lemmy.ml 8 points 4 months ago* (last edited 4 months ago)

Thank you for the context. I appreciate it.

From my perspective, someone claiming to represent Islamic socialism has a higher level of accountability and responsibility for actions on a public forum. Also, Islamic socialists dont need to rephrase white supremacist slogans when we have our own history, our own texts, and our own leaders... its all very peculiar.

[–] AlHouthi4President@lemmy.ml 11 points 4 months ago (2 children)

Thanks. I agree the interaction you linked is bizarre and concerning.

I just wanted to follow up for context after seeing another Muslim banned off the fediverse.

[–] AlHouthi4President@lemmy.ml 5 points 4 months ago (5 children)

Did they post it here or somewhere else?

[–] AlHouthi4President@lemmy.ml 25 points 5 months ago* (last edited 5 months ago)

The levels of alienation continue to surprise me

[–] AlHouthi4President@lemmy.ml 1 points 5 months ago

You have poked the treatlerites and they have weaponized their collective political power: down votes.

[–] AlHouthi4President@lemmy.ml 8 points 5 months ago

Khomeini pfp 🫡

[–] AlHouthi4President@lemmy.ml 14 points 6 months ago

Miami -> Bogota -> Caracas

I just searched. Tickets are ~500-700 USD.

[–] AlHouthi4President@lemmy.ml 2 points 8 months ago* (last edited 8 months ago)

I'm familiar with Sykes Picot and the history of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoomans. I'm not sure its totally fair to characterize Hussein as a British agent but I'm open to more evidence on the matter.

If we are being honest, Antoun Saadeh had the most realistic analysis of nationhood in the region of "the Levant": everyone is Syrians basically and has been Syrians for thousands of years. These statelets are just parts of bilad al Sham.

However, I'm pretty sure that after the last century of sectarianism and Sykes Picot, that return is basically impossible now and I know for a fact that many people in "Natural Syria" (or Greater Syria) categorically reject the concept.

At this point in time Palestine is the central struggle for all Syrians, Arabs, Muslims, and justice-loving people on earth. And the flag is a universally recognized symbol for that struggle. So I'm going to respect the flag.

[–] AlHouthi4President@lemmy.ml 3 points 8 months ago (2 children)

I always heard that Sharif Hussein designed the Palestinian flag.

Do you have source for this?

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