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founded 9 months ago
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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.ca/post/57149491

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cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/6205367

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/6205366

Archived link

...

Canadian canola businesses, such as Richardson and Viterra, apparently dreamed that the 2018–2021 dispute was a one-off. After it ended, they ramped up and sold even more to China, only to now lose most of a $5 billion market. I hope they finally understand that, as long as they have excessive exposure to China, they’ll be targets anytime the Chinese Communist Party wants to coerce changes in Canadian policy and behaviour. As the saying goes: “Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me!”

The CCP has a history of using access to China’s vast market as a disciplinary tool.

And it’s getting more aggressive. More than a dozen countries have been targeted in recent years: Japan suffered consumer boycotts due to a maritime dispute with Beijing, as did South Korea because it installed an American missile defence system. Norway was no longer able to export salmon to China after a Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to a Chinese dissident, and Australian agricultural products were banned because its government called for an investigation into COVID-19’s origin. Lithuania was excised out of China’s customs clearance system over its relations with Taiwan, and now Japan, again, is the target of economic coercion for stating that its security is intricately linked with that of Taiwan.

...

For the past decade, the CCP has been hardening China’s own self-sufficiency and cutting dependence on imports, while trying to make others asymmetrically dependent on China. It’s “you have to buy from me, but I don’t need you.” Massive subsidies and other market distortions incentivize many Chinese firms to overproduce and export the surplus, which is subjecting the rest of the world to a Second China Shock. Other countries now face a choice: be relegated to deindustrialized, middle-income suppliers of energy and commodities to the PRC’s manufacturing juggernaut, or band together to maintain a tech stack and industrial ecosystems largely decoupled from China’s.

...

If Canadian governments do nothing, our export profile with China will increasingly resemble that of Russia and other subordinate natural resource economies, plus some services. So far, China’s various trading partners have employed different, and not entirely effective, tactics in response. A coordinated and comprehensive effort is necessary.

...

The CCP is exploiting the situation to pressure Ottawa into making three strategic adjustments.

  • First, abandon efforts to align with American and European attempts to defend domestic industries and workers from Chinese overproduction.

  • Second, roll back the Indo-Pacific Strategy, which prioritizes ties with others in the region, particularly Taiwan.

  • And third, stifle Canadian opposition to a host of harmful PRC actions, such as aggressive moves in East Asia, support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, ongoing massive human rights violations, efforts to subvert global governance institutions, espionage and IP theft, transnational repression, foreign interference, and elite capture. Tariffs on agri-food are just one means toward the end of conditioning behaviour.

...

If you think canola is a problem now, imagine if China were able to integrate Canadian manufacturers into its production and supply chains for advanced technology, like green energy and electric vehicles. It could then align the economic interests of industrial ridings with the CCP’s. It already has leverage over Western provinces through energy and commodities and Atlantic provinces through seafood. Mining could do the same in the North. Manufacturing integration plus further Canadian financial sector investments in China would grow pressure points in Ontario and Quebec and help capture Laurentian elites.

...

Experience shows that, if the targeted country holds to a clear, consistent policy line, diversifies economically, and hardens politically against foreign interference, Beijing tends to quietly de-escalate and roll back once its officials internalize that the punishment is not only failing to change policies but also making them look bad. That’s more likely to happen if Party-state officials have an off-ramp and a face-saving narrative in which they can say the other guys “corrected their mistakes.”

China’s import tariffs hurt its own businesses and consumers too. Chinese companies buy Canadian commodities, unless their government blocks them from doing so, because they’re competitively priced. They can find alternative sources for canola, wheat, barley, pork, and pulses, but often at higher prices, which can affect food security and drive up inflation, especially when markets are tight.

...

Chinese manufacturers—particularly electric vehicle makers—really want access to the Canadian market, particularly as tariff barriers rise elsewhere. Granting BYD, Chery, Geely, and others access would legitimize the PRC’s narrative, which denies that its EV makers benefit from massive market distortions, and provide an example for other countries. Conversely, blocking these national champions, just as with Huawei and Hikvision, causes a loss of face for the CCP. Its opposition to Canadian tariffs on Chinese steel and aluminum is likewise more about symbolism than economic impact.

...

For Canadian exports, the way to reduce Chinese leverage and increase our own is diversification. The government needs to treat that as not only trade promotion but also a key element of national security policy, just as China has been doing for decades. Businesses need to invest in capacity to serve new markets. Resilience doesn’t come from autarky—with that, you end up like North Korea. It comes from having multiple, deeper relationships with more reliable, trustworthy partners that share most of your values and agree on following the letter and the spirit of common rules.

Canada’s other sources of leverage are political, not economic. They require coordinating with allies and like-minded partners to apply consistent collective limits on Chinese dumping, shared safeguards for supply chains, as well as common anti-coercion tools and technology restrictions.

...

A critical mass of middle powers coordinating their economic policy on China is a real problem for Beijing. With the US and EU on board, it’s a nightmare scenario. The G7, EU, and members of Trans-Pacific Partnership have important roles to play in crafting institutional mechanisms to overcome obstacles to collective action.

...

Every time China applies a punitive measure on Canada, take material steps in the other direction, like enhancing ties with Taiwan and other Indo-Pacific partners. Take measures that complicate PRC access to the Arctic, where it’s trying to expand its presence and influence. Incentivize pension funds to reweight their exposure away from China.

Steps like those are most effective when applied by multiple countries in coordination. Forming and hardening coalitions would help curtail backfilling in cases where China blocks imports from one country, like Canada, and then buys more from others, like Australia. Beijing uses bilateral leverage to achieve submission. Multilateral responses can thwart that.

...

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cross-posted from: https://discuss.online/post/32432803

“There are a lot more people out here living in abject poverty than what people like to think or admit to. You voted for this—and now we’re paying the price.”

Employees learned of the cuts on Monday in a video message from Michael Adams, CEO of BlueOval SK.

Adams announced the transition would mean “the end of all BlueOval SK positions in Kentucky.”

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.world/post/40401406

Advocates call for removal of machines and demand that company speak out against ICE raids in parking lots

A Home Depot in Los Angeles installed three high pitch noise-emitting machines outside to deter day laborers from seeking work there, causing them to suffer headaches and nausea, advocates alleged at a press conference on Wednesday.

The Instituto de Educacion Popular del Sur de California (IDEPSCA), an advocacy organization that helps day laborers, called for the removal of these machines from Home Depot's Cypress Park location, according to the Los Angeles Times

Advocates for day laborers also demanded that Home Depot speak out against ICE raids in store parking lots. Immigration enforcement agents have repeatedly targeted the Cypress Park location, which is located near one of IDEPSCA's support hubs, the Times reported.

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cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/43940614

Web archive link

In October 2023, a Hong Kong-flagged cargo ship dragged its anchor across the Baltic seabed, severing a gas pipeline and two communications cables between Finland and Estonia. In November 2024, cables linking Lithuania, Sweden, Germany and Finland—critical routes for regional internet connectivity and data transmission—were damaged in a similar way.

Chinese ships also seem increasingly clumsy in the Taiwan Strait. In the first two months of 2025 alone, Taiwan recorded four instances of damage to cables responsible for 99% of the island’s international internet traffic. One such incident in February involved the “Hong Tai 58”, flying a Togolese “convenience” flag. By April, prosecutors had indicted the ship’s Chinese owner for sabotage, which China vehemently denies.

...

Accidents happen. But these incidents involving cargo ships are more likely examples of China’s “military-civil fusion” strategy, through which it blends the military and civilian sectors and uses both to pursue its global interests. The maritime strand of the strategy goes well beyond errant anchors. Yet countries on the receiving end have struggled to find definitive proof of state-level coordination.

This has significant geostrategic implications. China’s deployment of non-military forces poses a silent but serious challenge to the norms that govern warfare and maritime security. It can also reproduce and scale up its strategy in any body of water. Europeans need to work with their allies in the Indo-Pacific to respond to China’s evolving maritime playbook—for the sake of Taiwan’s security, but also for their own.

...

China claims sovereignty and jurisdiction over the waters of the Taiwan Strait. But Western countries see the strait as international waters, where freedom of navigation applies, and oppose any unilateral change to the status quo. Moreover, China’s leader Xi Jinping has instructed the military to be ready for a Taiwan invasion by 2027. As part of this preparation, forces have drawn lessons from Russia’s war against Ukraine. Chief among these is that their victory needs to be swift, which becomes less likely if external actors get involved in helping the island defend itself.

...

As part of this, China has built up a an increasingly organised and coercive “maritime militia”. The militia is, in effect, an integral part of the country’s armed forces, trained and funded by government, but disguised as fishing cooperatives and fishers. The militia vessels are outfitted with Beidou satellite navigation systems and heavy-lift capabilities, which means they can conduct seabed-mapping and deploy hydrographic sensors.

...

In recent years, European navies—including those of Britain, France and Germany—have increased freedom-of-navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific, including transits through the Taiwan Strait. Though these they aim to safeguard supply chains of, for example, semiconductors, over 60% of which are made in Taiwan and without which European industries and militaries would grind to a halt. Since the start of 2025, vessels from Britain and France (and allies including America, Australia and Japan) have passed through the strait. As their presence grows, similar patterns of coercion to those in the South China Sea seem likely to emerge. Such incidents could become precursors to conflict, whether through miscalculation or deliberate false-flag incidents.

...

Given China’s use of covert and deniable strategies, the EU and European governments need to underpin their approach to China’s military-civil activities with clear policy signalling. More regular naval activity, such as transits through the Taiwan Strait and joint exercises in Indo-Pacific waters, would send a stronger signal that international attention and engagement in the region are steadily increasing.

...

European and Asian governments must further integrate their policy expertise and experience. Promising platforms to strengthen dialogue and cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners include the EU’s ESIWA, a programme to enhance security cooperation with allies in Asia; and CRIMARIO, the bloc’s project to safeguard critical maritime routes. European states have established strong information-sharing mechanisms and maritime capacity-building initiatives with countries such as the Philippines. They have also developed security and defence partnerships with Japan and South Korea. They should build on this to expand their maritime domain awareness and identify emerging patterns of maritime security threats.

...

Taiwan is on the front line of China’s military-civil fusion activities and has extensive experience identifying and responding to related threats. Europeans should therefore expand their dialogue with Taiwan on subsea-cable security and support Taipei’s participation in regional discussions on non-traditional security threats. This could even include participation in regional exercises related to such threats. This would reinforce information-sharing, strengthen collective preparedness and enhance resilience across the wider region. These efforts are not only for Asia’s benefit; they are a safeguard Europe needs for itself.

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Web archive link

In October 2023, a Hong Kong-flagged cargo ship dragged its anchor across the Baltic seabed, severing a gas pipeline and two communications cables between Finland and Estonia. In November 2024, cables linking Lithuania, Sweden, Germany and Finland—critical routes for regional internet connectivity and data transmission—were damaged in a similar way.

Chinese ships also seem increasingly clumsy in the Taiwan Strait. In the first two months of 2025 alone, Taiwan recorded four instances of damage to cables responsible for 99% of the island’s international internet traffic. One such incident in February involved the “Hong Tai 58”, flying a Togolese “convenience” flag. By April, prosecutors had indicted the ship’s Chinese owner for sabotage, which China vehemently denies.

...

Accidents happen. But these incidents involving cargo ships are more likely examples of China’s “military-civil fusion” strategy, through which it blends the military and civilian sectors and uses both to pursue its global interests. The maritime strand of the strategy goes well beyond errant anchors. Yet countries on the receiving end have struggled to find definitive proof of state-level coordination.

This has significant geostrategic implications. China’s deployment of non-military forces poses a silent but serious challenge to the norms that govern warfare and maritime security. It can also reproduce and scale up its strategy in any body of water. Europeans need to work with their allies in the Indo-Pacific to respond to China’s evolving maritime playbook—for the sake of Taiwan’s security, but also for their own.

...

China claims sovereignty and jurisdiction over the waters of the Taiwan Strait. But Western countries see the strait as international waters, where freedom of navigation applies, and oppose any unilateral change to the status quo. Moreover, China’s leader Xi Jinping has instructed the military to be ready for a Taiwan invasion by 2027. As part of this preparation, forces have drawn lessons from Russia’s war against Ukraine. Chief among these is that their victory needs to be swift, which becomes less likely if external actors get involved in helping the island defend itself.

...

As part of this, China has built up a an increasingly organised and coercive “maritime militia”. The militia is, in effect, an integral part of the country’s armed forces, trained and funded by government, but disguised as fishing cooperatives and fishers. The militia vessels are outfitted with Beidou satellite navigation systems and heavy-lift capabilities, which means they can conduct seabed-mapping and deploy hydrographic sensors.

...

In recent years, European navies—including those of Britain, France and Germany—have increased freedom-of-navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific, including transits through the Taiwan Strait. Though these they aim to safeguard supply chains of, for example, semiconductors, over 60% of which are made in Taiwan and without which European industries and militaries would grind to a halt. Since the start of 2025, vessels from Britain and France (and allies including America, Australia and Japan) have passed through the strait. As their presence grows, similar patterns of coercion to those in the South China Sea seem likely to emerge. Such incidents could become precursors to conflict, whether through miscalculation or deliberate false-flag incidents.

...

Given China’s use of covert and deniable strategies, the EU and European governments need to underpin their approach to China’s military-civil activities with clear policy signalling. More regular naval activity, such as transits through the Taiwan Strait and joint exercises in Indo-Pacific waters, would send a stronger signal that international attention and engagement in the region are steadily increasing.

...

European and Asian governments must further integrate their policy expertise and experience. Promising platforms to strengthen dialogue and cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners include the EU’s ESIWA, a programme to enhance security cooperation with allies in Asia; and CRIMARIO, the bloc’s project to safeguard critical maritime routes. European states have established strong information-sharing mechanisms and maritime capacity-building initiatives with countries such as the Philippines. They have also developed security and defence partnerships with Japan and South Korea. They should build on this to expand their maritime domain awareness and identify emerging patterns of maritime security threats.

...

Taiwan is on the front line of China’s military-civil fusion activities and has extensive experience identifying and responding to related threats. Europeans should therefore expand their dialogue with Taiwan on subsea-cable security and support Taipei’s participation in regional discussions on non-traditional security threats. This could even include participation in regional exercises related to such threats. This would reinforce information-sharing, strengthen collective preparedness and enhance resilience across the wider region. These efforts are not only for Asia’s benefit; they are a safeguard Europe needs for itself.

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The Friday deadline was mandated by a bill that got near-unanimous support in the US Congress.

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Russia's President Vladimir Putin has said there will be no more wars after Ukraine if Russia is treated with respect - and claims that Moscow is planning to attack European countries are "nonsense".

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Ukraine war latest: EU agrees €90bn loan for Ukraine as Putin tells BBC the West is 'making Russia the enemy' - BBC News

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The company says users will be able to delete the Copilot tile after confusion over recent software updates.

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A hacker gained control of a 1,100 mobile phone farm powering covert, AI-generated ads on TikTok.

Archived version: https://archive.is/20251218015621/https://www.404media.co/hack-reveals-the-a16z-backed-phone-farm-flooding-tiktok-with-ai-influencers/

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~ The URL is punycode, before anyone im comments suggest this is a shady link 🙃

A rather interesting article shedding light on how the famous Y Combinator’s Hacker News platform is steering its content away from users of they want to.

The full article here:

The Mysterious Forces Steering Views on Hacker News

18 December 2025 at 11:06 by marius@xn--gckvb8fzb.com (Marius)

JP. マリウス

I was initially torn about whether to publish this story, as I don’t have a clear or constructive recommendation on how to resolve the issue. I also didn’t want to come across as a paranoid conspiracy theorist – birds aren’t real, by the way. However, after repeatedly witnessing firsthand how Y Combinator’s Hacker News platform influences the spread of information and, consequently, opinions within the tech scene, I believe this topic deserves to be discussed, even if only briefly.

I approached this subject rationally, aiming to explain certain metrics I observed in my log files. I began exploring the Hacker News algorithms, along with related posts by other authors and, naturally, the comment sections of those discussions. Although I hadn’t previously delved into the topic, the deeper I went, the more I realized it wasn’t just a case of me being overly paranoid or seeing ghosts. It became increasingly clear that some form of censorship, whether through subtle slowing or outright blocking, does seem to be a recurring issue on the Hacker News platform. By censorship, I don’t mean the removal of deceptive or harmful content, but rather the suppression of factual material that happens to be critical of, let’s say, friends of Y Combinator.

I began writing this post after noticing unusual behavior when another one of my articles was shared on Hacker News. It triggered an immediate spike in traffic, which then dropped off abruptly for no apparent reason. While the post in question appeared to resonate with many readers, it rapidly fell from the top ranks of the Hacker News front page to the second, then third, and within minutes to the fourth page.

The decline was so sudden that even the very people whose product my post was criticizing, and who understandably weren’t pleased with it, stepped in to dispute any claims of censorship. Nevertheless, the data from my analytics clearly shows a traffic chart in a shape that couldn’t be further from being organic, leading to the assumption that the post was demoted from the front page both sharply and deliberately.

Note: The Element CEO’s comment reads:

neither YC nor any YC-intermediary is an investor in NV

This statement, however, doesn’t appear to be factually true. Protocol Labs, who is the lead investor of the Series B funding round of Element (New Vector), was initially founded as part of the Y Combinator S14 program.

This means that Y Combinator invested money into Protocol Labs, who in turn is a lead investor in New Vector, the company behind Element. One could argue that there is in fact an interest by Y Combinator, or at the very least by their friends over at Protocol Labs to protect Element from negative publicity – if you can even call my post that.

Similarly, I analyzed gigabytes of log files and traffic behavior for another post of mine that gathered some attention on news.ycombinator.com just recently. In this case, however, the censorship became more evident, even to the casual reader on Hacker News. If you’re looking at the post today, though, you might not fully understand the comments, as the post is clearly no longer flagged.

This critical deep dive into a specific project by a well-known tech figure took off within minutes of being shared on Hacker News. My analytics immediately alerted me to a surge in traffic, which is when I first noticed. The post reached the Top 5 list (on X) on Hacker News’ front page within minutes, accumulating over 40 upvotes in a short period. Then, abruptly, the traffic came to a complete stop when the post was suddenly flagged by Hacker News for no apparent reason.

Even though the post was flagged and essentially became invisible on the platform, community interest remained so high that the post went from about 50 upvotes to over 100, all while still being effectively censored. It wasn’t until several hours later (amid puzzled comments from the HN community and others) that Hacker News seemingly decided to silently unflag the post, as if nothing had ever happened and the post simply didn’t gain a lot of traction. And it worked:

The post had dropped from the visible ranks and wasn’t going to return. Hacker News had effectively stopped it at just the right the moment, when it could have gained serious traction, as it was scrutinizing a project tied to a prominent and influential tech figure.

While the post was picked up by Lobsters and spread further, attracting many views and, more importantly, thoughtful responses, its reach didn’t come close to matching the influence of what seems to be the most powerful tech aggregator on the internet.

Tl;dr

Hacker News is neither unbiased nor free from censorship. While it generally remains hands-off with neutral content, the moment a post that’s critical or even just slightly negative towards projects or companies affiliated with Y Combinator (either directly or indirectly) gains traction, the platform’s moderation team will seemingly step in to significantly limit its reach.

Unfortunately, I don’t believe there’s anything the community can do about this, as Hacker News has maintained its position as a leading tech news institution for years, with little competition on the horizon. As search engines continue their decline and are increasingly replaced by similarly censored LLMs, the discoverability of tech content, especially slightly more critical pieces, is likely to become a significant challenge in the future. My only advice is to keep in mind that, whenever you find yourself browsing Hacker News, you’re seeing a curated view of the current tech landscape that won’t necessarily represent the full picture.

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glorp beanis

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For several years now, in discussing plans for its human spaceflight program beyond the International Space Station, Russian officials would proudly bring up the Russian Orbital Station, or ROS.

The first elements of ROS were to launch in 2027 so it would be ready for human habitation in 2028. Upon completion in the mid-2030s, the station would encompass seven shiny new modules, potentially including a private habitat for space tourists. It would be so sophisticated that the station could fly autonomously for months if needed.

Importantly, the Russian station was also to fly in a polar orbit at about 400 km. This would allow the station to fly over the entirety of Russia, observing the whole country. It would be important for national pride because cosmonauts would not need to launch from Kazakhstan anymore. Rather, rockets launching from the country’s new spaceport in eastern Russia, the Vostochny Cosmodrome, would easily reach the ROS in its polar orbit.

That was the plan, at least until this week, when a Russian official dropped a bombshell.

Recycling the ISS

Oleg Orlov, director of the Institute of Biomedical Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences, said ROS will no longer be composed of entirely new modules. Rather, its core will be the Russian segment of the International Space Station.

“The Scientific and Technical Council of Roscosmos supported this proposal and approved the deployment of a Russian orbital station as part of the Russian segment of the ISS,” Orlov reportedly said.

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US President Donald Trump signed the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) into law Thursday, completing the passage of the largest military spending bill in US history—$901 billion, or over $1 trillion when combined with supplemental funding passed earlier this year.

The Senate voted 77-20 on Wednesday to pass the bill. The Democratic leadership, including Minority Leader Chuck Schumer of New York and Minority Whip Dick Durbin of Illinois, voted for the bill. They were joined by Senators Mark Kelly of Arizona and Elissa Slotkin of Michigan, both of whom released a video last month calling on military personnel to disobey illegal orders—as Trump was sending the US military on a murder spree off the coast of Latin America.

Citing Trump’s statements about using troops to shoot protesters in America, Slotkin invoked the legacy of the Nuremberg tribunals, which convicted Nazi leaders for war crimes and crimes against peace. But when it came time to vote, this invocation was revealed to be completely meaningless. Slotkin voted to hand Trump the resources to pursue his military adventure against Venezuela...

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soviet-playful

This is my best pickup line

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submitted 1 week ago* (last edited 1 week ago) by Dort_Owl@hexbear.net to c/badposting@hexbear.net
 
 
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