Australia

geteilt von: https://lemmy.zip/post/53982034

High Court challenge says law imposing ban is ‘grossly excessive’ and infringes on ‘constitutional right of freedom of political communication’

When senior Indigenous medico Dr Louis Peachey heard about police racially profiling a 17-year-old Aboriginal boy in Canberra, pulling him from a bus with guns drawn before realising he was the wrong person, Peachey was reminded of ‘The Talk’, and the ubiquity of institutional racism and the trauma it causes.

Please note this was written in 1993, so the wheels of time turned to prove Hugh White wrong in some of his assessments. But the strategic choices Australia has made feel a little clearer from reading this. Especially in this year 2025 as the geo-strategic game has violently woken from its long slumber under US domination.

Why Great Powers Sleepwalk to War — A Masterclass with Hugh White - podcast

Hugh Whites Strategy Reading List ^I haven't had time to read this, but its part of the supplementary material for the podcast conversation^

Archived

Taiwan’s de facto ambassador to Australia is urging the Albanese government to include the island in the AUKUS security pact, as he warned China’s coercive behaviour and military activity in the Pacific should ring alarm bells.

Douglas Hsu, Taiwan’s top representative in Australia, also warned that Chinese-made electric cars posed cybersecurity risks and said Beijing was trying to project military force across the region.

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“Last year, they launched long-range missiles into the South Pacific, and earlier this year they sent naval vessels surrounding Australia,” Hsu told The Australian Financial Review, referring to a Chinese naval taskforce’s circumnavigation of Australia in February and March.

“I don’t think they have any business ties with Antarctica. So why do they send their naval ship here in this region? I think that is the way they are showcasing their defence capacities, and that is certainly alarming to all the countries in the region.”

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Conceding it was a sensitive topic, Hsu said the Taiwanese government had expressed interest in joining Pillar II of AUKUS given the island’s capabilities in high-end technology, including artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

“With the capacity of Taiwan in manufacturing, we believe that we have the strength working with other countries, especially in AUKUS Pillar II, to advance those defence and technologies to the next level, so we believe that Taiwan can be helpful,” he said.

Pillar II of AUKUS – the technology stream of the pact – commits Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States to jointly accelerate the development of advanced capabilities including quantum computing, artificial intelligence, undersea warfare and hypersonic missiles.

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[Edit to include the archived link.]

Archive/non-paywall link.

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/5790373

Archived link

On November 22, Australia, Canada, and India unveiled a new trilateral partnership. The Australia-Canada-India Technology and Innovation (ACITI) Partnership, announced during the G-20 Summit in Johannesburg, commits the three countries to collaborate on emerging technologies, critical minerals, artificial intelligence, and green energy innovation.

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The announcement comes at a time when middle powers are steadily experimenting with specialized, issue-focused groupings. Minilateralism has become a preferred way for states to pursue targeted cooperation without the burdens of alliances or the paralysis of large multilateral organizations.

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First, until now, India, Australia, and Canada have not operated within a dedicated institutional framework focused on high technology and innovation. Their interactions have remained bilateral, episodic, or embedded within broader platforms, such as the G-20 or the Commonwealth. ACITI introduces a structured, issue-based mechanism that ties the three together in a way that neither geography nor formal alliances previously did.

Second, the geography of the grouping is particularly distinctive. Most minilaterals cluster within a single strategic theater. By contrast, ACITI stretches across Asia, Oceania, and North America. It links three regions whose engagements have historically been mediated through larger Western institutions or broader Indo-Pacific strategies. By forming a triangle that spans oceans rather than strengthening an existing regional silo, the partnership implicitly advocates for a different approach to strategy that is not region-bound.

Third, equally significant is the language in which this partnership has been framed. References to net-zero transitions, responsible technology, democratic innovation, and critical supply-chain resilience indicate that ACITI is based on normative convergence. Each country – Australia, Canada, and India – sees technology governance and the green transition as arenas where political identity is expressed. For this reason, the formation of ACITI is also a symbolic articulation of shared democratic values. This introduces a layer of uncertainty that is unusual for new minilaterals.

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ACITI arrives at a time of uneven political alignment among its members. The success of trilaterals depends on the stability of all three bilateral legs. For now, the Canada-India leg is visibly weaker. While Australia-India ties are robust and expanding, the Canada-India relationship has experienced deep turbulence over the past few years. Diplomatic tensions, political accusations, and diaspora driven flashpoints have created moments of severe strain.

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There is another challenge as well: the geopolitical environment in which ACITI has emerged. Technology partnerships increasingly operate under the shadow of major power competition. China is likely to interpret ACITI as another democratic arrangement designed to complicate its technological and industrial dominance. The United States may welcome it, but Washington’s tendency to fold every initiative into its own strategic logic could place unforeseen pressure on the triangle. Managing these cross-pressures while maintaining autonomy will be a key test of ACITI’s strategic maturity.

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ACITI captures the possibilities of new minilateral thinking, but also exposes the vulnerabilities that come with untested diplomatic geometry. Whether it endures will depend on institutional follow-through, political steadiness, and the ability to deliver early. If it succeeds, it could serve as a template for a new class of ... partnerships defined by innovation rather than geography.

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cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/5768140

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This comes against the backdrop of this year’s supply chain issues, where China, as a dominant producer, has used export restrictions as leverage in its trade conflict with the USA. Against this backdrop, EU Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič outlined how Europe intends to invest more heavily in Australian critical raw material projects in the future – ranging from equity participations and long-term off-take agreements to joint infrastructure initiatives.

Šefčovič made it clear that the EU’s focus is no longer solely on trade in the classical sense. Instead, targeted capital commitments and binding supply agreements are intended to secure the supply of critical raw materials in the long term. For Brussels, Australia is a key partner, possessing large reserves and stable political frameworks, and aiming to expand its role as a supplier of strategically important raw materials.

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Australia is moving into the spotlight as a reliable supplier of critical raw materials. The country possesses significant deposits, for example of lithium, rare earths, graphite, and other raw materials required for batteries, high technology, and the energy transition. At the same time, Australia is considered a politically stable and legally secure investment location that seeks to expand its cooperation with like-minded partners.

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For Šefčovič, Japan serves as a reference model for what such a raw materials strategy could look like. For years, Tokyo has been strategically investing in mines and refineries in partner countries to ensure its own industry can be supplied with critical raw materials even in times of crisis. The EU is now pursuing a similar approach: moving away from a purely market-based procurement policy towards strategic participations along the value chain.

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Against this backdrop, the planned free trade agreement between the EU and Australia is also gaining new significance. An initial attempt failed in 2023, primarily due to differences in agricultural policy, as Canberra demanded greater access for agricultural products to the European market. However, Šefčovič now sees renewed “momentum” for new talks. He expects negotiations to resume early next year.

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