this post was submitted on 01 Nov 2026
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Attesting is very different from protecting
The binary performing the inference isn't running in the TEE, because the TEE runs on a weaker processor. The TEE is validating that the binary running on the main processors hasn't been tampered with
That's decent, but doesn't match the statement that inference is happening in the TEE
I think the phrase "running in the TEE" is the idiomatic way to describe a program running on the main CPU, attested by the TEE processor, and protected/isolated from other processes on the system (modulo exploits, lol). I'm vaguely familiar with AMD's SEV-SNP, mainly from reading security papers rather than any hands-on experience. I make no claims about Apple's Secure Enclave, though.
I very much disagree with
In the Confidentiality/Integrity/Availability triangle, a secondary process running in another operating system gives you integrity, but not confidentiality
You both should just read the docs
https://docs.darkbloom.dev/security/overview
They lay out all the protections they have in place to ensure private prompt execution. The TEE is used to validate the integrity of the binary, and they use other protections like E2EE, SEV-SNP on the coordinator, MacOS security protections (hardened runtime, SIP, kernel protections, etc), plus (from what i can tell an optional enrollment from providers) in Apple's MDM which makes Apple verify the integrity of the system.
That's literally what I said, and why I disagreed with the other poster saying it ran in the TEE
Whether the protections of the main binary are sufficient I've made no comment on