Hello all!

Thanks for all the interest and support you have shown for Journiv so far. If you don't already know about Journiv:

Journiv is a self-hosted private journaling application that puts you in complete control of your personal reflections. Built with privacy and simplicity at its core, Journiv offers comprehensive journaling capabilities including mood tracking, prompt-based journaling, media uploads, analytics, and advanced search. All while keeping your data on your own infrastructure.

CalDAV and VJOURNAL are pretty popular in self hosted world and it has been asked few times why Journiv does not use VJOURNAL. So I wrote a blogpost about it to share my research and learning from initial days of Journiv.

If you find anything technically incorrect or have any feedback/suggestion around this I will love to hear it! I think there are lot of experts/users of CalDAV and VJOURNAL here from whom I can learn more.

Thank you.

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/23191730

Even with LG’s concession, it may become more difficult to avoid chatbots on TVs.

LG says it will let people delete the Copilot icon from their TVs soon, but it still has plans to weave the service throughout webOS. The Copilot web app rollout seems to have been a taste of LG’s bigger plans to add Copilot to some of its 2025 OLED TVs. In a January announcement, LG said Copilot will help users find stuff to watch by “allowing users to efficiently find and organize complex information using contextual cues.” LG also said Copilot would “proactively” identify potential user problems and offer “timely, effective solutions.”

Some TVs from LG’s biggest rival, Samsung, have included Copilot since August. Owners of supporting 2025 TVs can speak to Copilot using their remote’s microphone. They can also access Copilot via the Tizen OS homescreen’s Apps tab or through the TVs’ Click to Search feature, which lets users press a dedicated remote button to search for content while watching live TV or Samsung TV Plus. Users can also ask the TV to make AI-generated wallpapers or provide real-time subtitle translations.

cross-posted from: https://no.lastname.nz/post/2050418

This month, OpenAI announced "up to $2 million" in funding for research studies on AI safety and well-being. At its surface, this may seem generous, but following in the footsteps of other tech giants facing scrutiny over their products’ mental health impacts, it's nothing more than grantwashing.

This industry practice commits a pittance to research that is doomed to be ineffective due to information and resources that companies hold back. When grantwashing works, it compromises the search for answers. And that's an insult to anyone whose loved one’s death involved chatbots.

OpenAI's pledge came a week after the company's lawyers argued that the company isn't to blame in the death of a California teenager who ChatGPT encouraged to commit suicide. In the company's attempt to disclaim responsibility in court, they even requested a list of invitees to the teen's memorial and video footage of the service and the people there. In the last year, OpenAI and other generative AI companies have been accused of causing numerous deaths and psychotic breaks by encouraging people into suicide, feeding delusions, and giving them risky instructions

Bonfire and Ben Pate's Emisaary (which powers Bandwagon) are the first two to implement.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.ca/post/57149491

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/6205367

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/6205366

Archived link

...

Canadian canola businesses, such as Richardson and Viterra, apparently dreamed that the 2018–2021 dispute was a one-off. After it ended, they ramped up and sold even more to China, only to now lose most of a $5 billion market. I hope they finally understand that, as long as they have excessive exposure to China, they’ll be targets anytime the Chinese Communist Party wants to coerce changes in Canadian policy and behaviour. As the saying goes: “Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me!”

The CCP has a history of using access to China’s vast market as a disciplinary tool.

And it’s getting more aggressive. More than a dozen countries have been targeted in recent years: Japan suffered consumer boycotts due to a maritime dispute with Beijing, as did South Korea because it installed an American missile defence system. Norway was no longer able to export salmon to China after a Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to a Chinese dissident, and Australian agricultural products were banned because its government called for an investigation into COVID-19’s origin. Lithuania was excised out of China’s customs clearance system over its relations with Taiwan, and now Japan, again, is the target of economic coercion for stating that its security is intricately linked with that of Taiwan.

...

For the past decade, the CCP has been hardening China’s own self-sufficiency and cutting dependence on imports, while trying to make others asymmetrically dependent on China. It’s “you have to buy from me, but I don’t need you.” Massive subsidies and other market distortions incentivize many Chinese firms to overproduce and export the surplus, which is subjecting the rest of the world to a Second China Shock. Other countries now face a choice: be relegated to deindustrialized, middle-income suppliers of energy and commodities to the PRC’s manufacturing juggernaut, or band together to maintain a tech stack and industrial ecosystems largely decoupled from China’s.

...

If Canadian governments do nothing, our export profile with China will increasingly resemble that of Russia and other subordinate natural resource economies, plus some services. So far, China’s various trading partners have employed different, and not entirely effective, tactics in response. A coordinated and comprehensive effort is necessary.

...

The CCP is exploiting the situation to pressure Ottawa into making three strategic adjustments.

• First, abandon efforts to align with American and European attempts to defend domestic industries and workers from Chinese overproduction.

• Second, roll back the Indo-Pacific Strategy, which prioritizes ties with others in the region, particularly Taiwan.

• And third, stifle Canadian opposition to a host of harmful PRC actions, such as aggressive moves in East Asia, support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, ongoing massive human rights violations, efforts to subvert global governance institutions, espionage and IP theft, transnational repression, foreign interference, and elite capture. Tariffs on agri-food are just one means toward the end of conditioning behaviour.

...

If you think canola is a problem now, imagine if China were able to integrate Canadian manufacturers into its production and supply chains for advanced technology, like green energy and electric vehicles. It could then align the economic interests of industrial ridings with the CCP’s. It already has leverage over Western provinces through energy and commodities and Atlantic provinces through seafood. Mining could do the same in the North. Manufacturing integration plus further Canadian financial sector investments in China would grow pressure points in Ontario and Quebec and help capture Laurentian elites.

...

Experience shows that, if the targeted country holds to a clear, consistent policy line, diversifies economically, and hardens politically against foreign interference, Beijing tends to quietly de-escalate and roll back once its officials internalize that the punishment is not only failing to change policies but also making them look bad. That’s more likely to happen if Party-state officials have an off-ramp and a face-saving narrative in which they can say the other guys “corrected their mistakes.”

China’s import tariffs hurt its own businesses and consumers too. Chinese companies buy Canadian commodities, unless their government blocks them from doing so, because they’re competitively priced. They can find alternative sources for canola, wheat, barley, pork, and pulses, but often at higher prices, which can affect food security and drive up inflation, especially when markets are tight.

...

Chinese manufacturers—particularly electric vehicle makers—really want access to the Canadian market, particularly as tariff barriers rise elsewhere. Granting BYD, Chery, Geely, and others access would legitimize the PRC’s narrative, which denies that its EV makers benefit from massive market distortions, and provide an example for other countries. Conversely, blocking these national champions, just as with Huawei and Hikvision, causes a loss of face for the CCP. Its opposition to Canadian tariffs on Chinese steel and aluminum is likewise more about symbolism than economic impact.

...

For Canadian exports, the way to reduce Chinese leverage and increase our own is diversification. The government needs to treat that as not only trade promotion but also a key element of national security policy, just as China has been doing for decades. Businesses need to invest in capacity to serve new markets. Resilience doesn’t come from autarky—with that, you end up like North Korea. It comes from having multiple, deeper relationships with more reliable, trustworthy partners that share most of your values and agree on following the letter and the spirit of common rules.

Canada’s other sources of leverage are political, not economic. They require coordinating with allies and like-minded partners to apply consistent collective limits on Chinese dumping, shared safeguards for supply chains, as well as common anti-coercion tools and technology restrictions.

...

A critical mass of middle powers coordinating their economic policy on China is a real problem for Beijing. With the US and EU on board, it’s a nightmare scenario. The G7, EU, and members of Trans-Pacific Partnership have important roles to play in crafting institutional mechanisms to overcome obstacles to collective action.

...

Every time China applies a punitive measure on Canada, take material steps in the other direction, like enhancing ties with Taiwan and other Indo-Pacific partners. Take measures that complicate PRC access to the Arctic, where it’s trying to expand its presence and influence. Incentivize pension funds to reweight their exposure away from China.

Steps like those are most effective when applied by multiple countries in coordination. Forming and hardening coalitions would help curtail backfilling in cases where China blocks imports from one country, like Canada, and then buys more from others, like Australia. Beijing uses bilateral leverage to achieve submission. Multilateral responses can thwart that.

...

cross-posted from: https://discuss.online/post/32432803

“There are a lot more people out here living in abject poverty than what people like to think or admit to. You voted for this—and now we’re paying the price.”

Employees learned of the cuts on Monday in a video message from Michael Adams, CEO of BlueOval SK.

Adams announced the transition would mean “the end of all BlueOval SK positions in Kentucky.”

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.world/post/40401406

Advocates call for removal of machines and demand that company speak out against ICE raids in parking lots

A Home Depot in Los Angeles installed three high pitch noise-emitting machines outside to deter day laborers from seeking work there, causing them to suffer headaches and nausea, advocates alleged at a press conference on Wednesday.

The Instituto de Educacion Popular del Sur de California (IDEPSCA), an advocacy organization that helps day laborers, called for the removal of these machines from Home Depot's Cypress Park location, according to the Los Angeles Times

Advocates for day laborers also demanded that Home Depot speak out against ICE raids in store parking lots. Immigration enforcement agents have repeatedly targeted the Cypress Park location, which is located near one of IDEPSCA's support hubs, the Times reported.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.world/post/40420508

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/43940614

Web archive link

In October 2023, a Hong Kong-flagged cargo ship dragged its anchor across the Baltic seabed, severing a gas pipeline and two communications cables between Finland and Estonia. In November 2024, cables linking Lithuania, Sweden, Germany and Finland—critical routes for regional internet connectivity and data transmission—were damaged in a similar way.

Chinese ships also seem increasingly clumsy in the Taiwan Strait. In the first two months of 2025 alone, Taiwan recorded four instances of damage to cables responsible for 99% of the island’s international internet traffic. One such incident in February involved the “Hong Tai 58”, flying a Togolese “convenience” flag. By April, prosecutors had indicted the ship’s Chinese owner for sabotage, which China vehemently denies.

...

Accidents happen. But these incidents involving cargo ships are more likely examples of China’s “military-civil fusion” strategy, through which it blends the military and civilian sectors and uses both to pursue its global interests. The maritime strand of the strategy goes well beyond errant anchors. Yet countries on the receiving end have struggled to find definitive proof of state-level coordination.

This has significant geostrategic implications. China’s deployment of non-military forces poses a silent but serious challenge to the norms that govern warfare and maritime security. It can also reproduce and scale up its strategy in any body of water. Europeans need to work with their allies in the Indo-Pacific to respond to China’s evolving maritime playbook—for the sake of Taiwan’s security, but also for their own.

...

China claims sovereignty and jurisdiction over the waters of the Taiwan Strait. But Western countries see the strait as international waters, where freedom of navigation applies, and oppose any unilateral change to the status quo. Moreover, China’s leader Xi Jinping has instructed the military to be ready for a Taiwan invasion by 2027. As part of this preparation, forces have drawn lessons from Russia’s war against Ukraine. Chief among these is that their victory needs to be swift, which becomes less likely if external actors get involved in helping the island defend itself.

...

As part of this, China has built up a an increasingly organised and coercive “maritime militia”. The militia is, in effect, an integral part of the country’s armed forces, trained and funded by government, but disguised as fishing cooperatives and fishers. The militia vessels are outfitted with Beidou satellite navigation systems and heavy-lift capabilities, which means they can conduct seabed-mapping and deploy hydrographic sensors.

...

In recent years, European navies—including those of Britain, France and Germany—have increased freedom-of-navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific, including transits through the Taiwan Strait. Though these they aim to safeguard supply chains of, for example, semiconductors, over 60% of which are made in Taiwan and without which European industries and militaries would grind to a halt. Since the start of 2025, vessels from Britain and France (and allies including America, Australia and Japan) have passed through the strait. As their presence grows, similar patterns of coercion to those in the South China Sea seem likely to emerge. Such incidents could become precursors to conflict, whether through miscalculation or deliberate false-flag incidents.

...

Given China’s use of covert and deniable strategies, the EU and European governments need to underpin their approach to China’s military-civil activities with clear policy signalling. More regular naval activity, such as transits through the Taiwan Strait and joint exercises in Indo-Pacific waters, would send a stronger signal that international attention and engagement in the region are steadily increasing.

...

European and Asian governments must further integrate their policy expertise and experience. Promising platforms to strengthen dialogue and cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners include the EU’s ESIWA, a programme to enhance security cooperation with allies in Asia; and CRIMARIO, the bloc’s project to safeguard critical maritime routes. European states have established strong information-sharing mechanisms and maritime capacity-building initiatives with countries such as the Philippines. They have also developed security and defence partnerships with Japan and South Korea. They should build on this to expand their maritime domain awareness and identify emerging patterns of maritime security threats.

...

Taiwan is on the front line of China’s military-civil fusion activities and has extensive experience identifying and responding to related threats. Europeans should therefore expand their dialogue with Taiwan on subsea-cable security and support Taipei’s participation in regional discussions on non-traditional security threats. This could even include participation in regional exercises related to such threats. This would reinforce information-sharing, strengthen collective preparedness and enhance resilience across the wider region. These efforts are not only for Asia’s benefit; they are a safeguard Europe needs for itself.

Web archive link

In October 2023, a Hong Kong-flagged cargo ship dragged its anchor across the Baltic seabed, severing a gas pipeline and two communications cables between Finland and Estonia. In November 2024, cables linking Lithuania, Sweden, Germany and Finland—critical routes for regional internet connectivity and data transmission—were damaged in a similar way.

Chinese ships also seem increasingly clumsy in the Taiwan Strait. In the first two months of 2025 alone, Taiwan recorded four instances of damage to cables responsible for 99% of the island’s international internet traffic. One such incident in February involved the “Hong Tai 58”, flying a Togolese “convenience” flag. By April, prosecutors had indicted the ship’s Chinese owner for sabotage, which China vehemently denies.

...

Accidents happen. But these incidents involving cargo ships are more likely examples of China’s “military-civil fusion” strategy, through which it blends the military and civilian sectors and uses both to pursue its global interests. The maritime strand of the strategy goes well beyond errant anchors. Yet countries on the receiving end have struggled to find definitive proof of state-level coordination.

This has significant geostrategic implications. China’s deployment of non-military forces poses a silent but serious challenge to the norms that govern warfare and maritime security. It can also reproduce and scale up its strategy in any body of water. Europeans need to work with their allies in the Indo-Pacific to respond to China’s evolving maritime playbook—for the sake of Taiwan’s security, but also for their own.

...

China claims sovereignty and jurisdiction over the waters of the Taiwan Strait. But Western countries see the strait as international waters, where freedom of navigation applies, and oppose any unilateral change to the status quo. Moreover, China’s leader Xi Jinping has instructed the military to be ready for a Taiwan invasion by 2027. As part of this preparation, forces have drawn lessons from Russia’s war against Ukraine. Chief among these is that their victory needs to be swift, which becomes less likely if external actors get involved in helping the island defend itself.

...

As part of this, China has built up a an increasingly organised and coercive “maritime militia”. The militia is, in effect, an integral part of the country’s armed forces, trained and funded by government, but disguised as fishing cooperatives and fishers. The militia vessels are outfitted with Beidou satellite navigation systems and heavy-lift capabilities, which means they can conduct seabed-mapping and deploy hydrographic sensors.

...

In recent years, European navies—including those of Britain, France and Germany—have increased freedom-of-navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific, including transits through the Taiwan Strait. Though these they aim to safeguard supply chains of, for example, semiconductors, over 60% of which are made in Taiwan and without which European industries and militaries would grind to a halt. Since the start of 2025, vessels from Britain and France (and allies including America, Australia and Japan) have passed through the strait. As their presence grows, similar patterns of coercion to those in the South China Sea seem likely to emerge. Such incidents could become precursors to conflict, whether through miscalculation or deliberate false-flag incidents.

...

Given China’s use of covert and deniable strategies, the EU and European governments need to underpin their approach to China’s military-civil activities with clear policy signalling. More regular naval activity, such as transits through the Taiwan Strait and joint exercises in Indo-Pacific waters, would send a stronger signal that international attention and engagement in the region are steadily increasing.

...

European and Asian governments must further integrate their policy expertise and experience. Promising platforms to strengthen dialogue and cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners include the EU’s ESIWA, a programme to enhance security cooperation with allies in Asia; and CRIMARIO, the bloc’s project to safeguard critical maritime routes. European states have established strong information-sharing mechanisms and maritime capacity-building initiatives with countries such as the Philippines. They have also developed security and defence partnerships with Japan and South Korea. They should build on this to expand their maritime domain awareness and identify emerging patterns of maritime security threats.

...

Taiwan is on the front line of China’s military-civil fusion activities and has extensive experience identifying and responding to related threats. Europeans should therefore expand their dialogue with Taiwan on subsea-cable security and support Taipei’s participation in regional discussions on non-traditional security threats. This could even include participation in regional exercises related to such threats. This would reinforce information-sharing, strengthen collective preparedness and enhance resilience across the wider region. These efforts are not only for Asia’s benefit; they are a safeguard Europe needs for itself.

The Friday deadline was mandated by a bill that got near-unanimous support in the US Congress.

Russia's President Vladimir Putin has said there will be no more wars after Ukraine if Russia is treated with respect - and claims that Moscow is planning to attack European countries are "nonsense".

Ukraine war latest: EU agrees €90bn loan for Ukraine as Putin tells BBC the West is 'making Russia the enemy' - BBC News