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In almost four years of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it has become evident that Moscow’s technological alliances have reshaped not only the future of the battlefield but also the foundations of international security. The threats no longer lie in the number of tanks or missiles that a given army has. As the war in Ukraine has shown, technological advances in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and advanced radar jamming technologies have allowed for asymmetric application of such technologies, often rendering classical concepts of deterrence, defense, and security architecture obsolete.
At the center of this shift stands a China-enabled drone supply network that is rapidly transforming Russia’s capacity for sustained, cost-effective, and scalable warfare.
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Chinese-supplied components in Shahed-type and now Geran drones enable longer-range, more cost-effective, and precise strikes. The result is an increasing asymmetric threat to the European continent and beyond. Even more alarming are reverse technological transfers to Moscow’s other Asian allies, such as North Korea, which has been rumored to receive both technology and manufacturing training for the Shahed/Geran drones.
If left unaddressed, this China-enabled supply chain risks becoming the backbone of a new model of warfare that exploits cost asymmetries, sanctions loopholes, and alliance-based technology transfers across multiple domains simultaneously.
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Chinese-made components is much more substantial [according to] Ukrainian drone specialists [who] indicate that Russia has made significant upgrades to three dimensions of Shahed/Geran drones: maneuverability and controllability, jamming resistance, and tactical versatility. Combined, these upgrades allow Russia to test new asymmetrical tactics that are becoming an increasingly challenging issue for air defenses in Ukraine and could be utilized beyond Ukraine in the future. Russia’s UAV barrages continue playing a successful role in strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure as part of Russia’s cognitive warfare as well.
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Chinese-supplied components that enable Geran’s maneuverability and controllability also allow for other tactical and asymmetric applications. As an example, Ukrainian Air Forces and Army Aviation Forces have been seen utilizing helicopters and Yak-52 trainer aircraft as airborne anti-Geran defenses. To counter this threat, a Geran-2 drone has been fitted with an R-60 air-to-air missile. While currently rumored to be a one-off occurrence, the integration of heat-seeking missiles into the drone makes Geran a fully fledged air-to-air weapons-systems platform.
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In 2025, Moscow also conducted drone incursions over NATO airspace. Reports from the incident in Poland indicate that the Gerbera decoy drones were used in these provocations. While most of the drones were successfully neutralized, the equipment used to shoot down the drones shows both the asymmetric threat of such barrages and the unprecedented levels of cost-effectiveness that Moscow was able to reach.
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Russia is also rumored to be supplying North Korea with the technology for Shahed/Geran drones and even employing and training up to 12,000 North Korean workers in its Geran drone production lines. Combined with the effectiveness of constant drone innovation and technological transfers within Moscow’s close-knit circle of allies, it is only a matter of time until the spillover effect of the Geran drones reaches the Asia-Pacific and alters the strategic balance in the region.
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Ukrainian defense specialists emphasize that Russia’s military-industrial sector continues to acquire drone technologies ... often via third countries that re-label and repackage components, making traceability nearly impossible under current sanction frameworks. Recent reports of drones produced entirely from Chinese parts further underscore the selectivity of Beijing’s export restrictions and the vulnerability of current EU and U.S. controls.
Targeting these networks demands coordinated monitoring of Russia’s parallel import hubs in Hong Kong, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkiye, Vietnam, and the Balkan states, alongside penalties for intermediaries and financial institutions supporting these schemes.
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Equally important is addressing the role of e-commerce platforms, where dual-use components can be purchased in small but continuous volumes and aggregated into a significant industrial supply source for Russia’s drone assembly lines. Restricting these procurement routes is essential for limiting Russia’s ability to sustain its cost-effective asymmetric warfare capabilities and the broader China-enabled military-industrial complex. Sanctions must not only focus on intermediaries directly supplying Russia but also on financial institutions enabling monetary transfers, such as Russian burner banks.
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